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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO · -

CHARLES MURRAY, ADMINISTRATOR,
Plaintiff

CASE NO. 312322

v

JUDGE R. SUSTER

STATE OF OHIO,
Defendant

-

STATE OF OHIO'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
RE: APPLICABILITY OF
EVID. R. 404 TO NON PARTIES AND RENEWED
MOTION FOR LIMITING
INSTRUSCTION
REGARDING EBERLING
CONVICTION OF
MURDER OF ETHEL
DURKIN

INTRODUCTION
Defendant has objected to admission of evidence of" other acts" presented by
plaintiff for the purpose of incriminating Richard Eberling. Defendant's objections are
based upon Evid. R. 404 which prohibits the use of character evidence to prove that an
individual acted in conformity therewith. This court has questioned whether Evid. R.
404 applies to third parties . As demonstrated below, it does. Defendant submits
herewith its authority in support of a limiting instruction regarding Richard Eberling's
conviction of the murder of Ethel Durkin.

-

LAW AND ARGUMENT

The Ohio Supreme Court stated in 1998, "Evidence. R. 404, by its terms, applies to
all character evidence, not simply to persons accused of crimes ... ", State v. Mason,

(1998) 82 Ohio St.3d 144, at 160, Emphasis Added.

The issue the court evaluated was

the exclusion by the trial court of evidence of other acts of the victim's husband, whom
the defendant (Mason) alleged had committed the murder. In finding that such evidence
is properly excluded under Evid. R. 404, the court stated:

"Exclusion from a murder trial of evidence of prior specific violent acts by the
victim's husband, who defendant claimed was the killer, did not violate
defendant's constitutional rights, where the evidence was inadmissible under the
rule generally prohibiting character evidence", State v. Mason, supra, syllabus.

-

Also it is clear that Evid. R. 404 fully applies to civil action. Tschantz v. Ferguson
(Eighth District 1994) , 97 Ohio App.3d 693.
Under the foregoing authority it is abundantly clear that Evid.R. 404 's prohibition
against the use of character evidence in order to prove that a person acted in conformity
therewith applies to all character evidence. Accordingly, defendant respectfully renews
its motion for a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the conviction of Richard
Eberling for the murder of Ethel Durkin.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA
COUNTY PROSECUTOR
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Law Re: Applicability of Evid. R. 404 to
Nonparties was served personally upon Terry Gilbert, counsel for plaintiff, in Court
Room 20 B, Courts Tower, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.

Respectfully Submitted,

arilyn Cassidy
Assistant Prosecutor
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82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, State v. Mason, (Ohio 1998)
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*144 82 Ohio St.3d 144
694 N.E.2d 932
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,
v.

MASON, Appellant.
No. 97-239.
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Submitted Feb. 17, 1998.

Ohio 1998.
Due process, as guaranteed by the Federal and State
Constitutions, requires that an indigent criminal
defendant be provided funds to obtain expert
assistance at state expense only where the trial court
finds, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that the
defendant has made a particularized showing (1) of a
reasonable probability that the requested expert would
aid in his defense, and (2) that denial of the requested
expert assistance would result in an unfair trial.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Const. Art. 1, § 16;
R.C. § 2929.024; Superintendence Rule 20, subd.
IV(D).

Decided June 17, 1998.

-

Defendant was convicted of murder and other
offenses and sentenced to death following a jury trial
in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Marion County,
Evans, J., affirmed, and he appealed again. The
Supreme Court, Moyer, C.J., held that: (1) denial of
additional state-funded investigative and expert
assistance was not error; (2) defendant was not in
custody during two prearrest police-station interviews,
and his statements were voluntary; (3) denial of
continuance was not error; (4) no errors occurred
during voir dire; (5) crime-scene and autopsy photos
were admissible; (6) use of police-interview
transcripts was not error; (7) evidence of prior
specific violent acts by the victim's husband was
properly excluded; (8) guilt-phase instructions were
proper; (9) no prosecutorial misconduct occurred
during cross-examination of defendant or in final
arguments; (10) evidence supported conviction; (11)
penalty-phase instructions were proper; (12) jury was
not shown to be racially biased; (13) supplemental
instruction urging further penalty-phase deliberations
was properly given; (14) no jury misconduct was
shown; (15) defense counsel was not ineffective; (16)
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating
factors; and (17) death sentence was neither excessive
nor disproportionate.
Affirmed.

-

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ~268.2(3)
92
92XII Due Process of Law
Criminal Prosecutions
92k256
Disadvantaged Persons, Counsel and
92k268.2
Trial
92k268.2(3)
Indigents; transcript and financial
aid.

2. COSTS ~302.2(2)
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forma Pauperis
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence
102k302.2(2)
Expert witnesses or assistance in
general.
Ohio 1998.
Indigent defendant was not entitled to a state-funded
soil expert in a prosecution for murder of a victim
found in a rural area, where at trial he repeatedly
made the point that the state produced no evidence of
dirt on his clothing, and where, even had a soil expert
testified that the dirt on his shoes was inconsistent
with the crime-scene dirt, the probative value would
have been minimal at best, in that the police did not
take the shoes for several days after the victim's
disappearance.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14;
R.C. § 2929.024;
Const. Art. 1, § 16;
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D).
3. COSTS ~302.2(2)
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forma Pauperis
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence
102k302.2(2)
Expert witnesses or assistance in
general.
Ohio 1998.
Indigent defendant was not entitled to a state-funded
shoeprint expert in a murder prosecution in which the
state used shoeprints found in the victim's car to
support its theory that a struggle had taken place,
where he did not make a particularized showing that a
shoeprint expert might have rebutted that inference or

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works

82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, State v. Mason, (Ohio 1998)
that a privately retained shoe expert would have been
able to identify the shoeprints more specifically than
could the state's experts. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5
, 14; Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024;
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D).
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6. COSTS <e::=302.3
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301. l Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forrna Pauperis
102k302.3 Investigative assistance.

4. CRIMINAL LAW <e::=1028

110
l lOXXIV Review
1 lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
llOXXIV(E)l In General
l 10kl028
Presentation of questions in general.
[See headnote text below]
4. CRIMINAL LAW <e::=1045
110
1 lOXXIV Review
11 OXXIV (E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
l lOXXIV (E) 1 In General
Necessity of ruling on objection or
l 10kl045
motion.

-

Ohio 1998.
Supreme Court will not ordinarily consider a claim
of error that was not raised in any way in the Court of
Appeals and was not considered or decided by that
court.
5. COSTS <e::=302.2(2)
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forma Pauperis
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence
102k302.2(2) Expert witnesses or assistance in
general.

-

Ohio 1998.
Indigent murder defendant was not prejudiced by the
trial court's refusal to provide a state-funded
eyewitness-identification expert, and thus the refusal
was not an abuse of discretion, where the state
presented substantial evidence other than eyewitness
identifications, defense counsel fully and adequately
cross-examined each eyewitness, and defendant
without state funds procured an eyewitnessidentification expert whose testimony the jury heard.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Const. Art. 1, § 16;
R.C. § 2929.024; Superintendence Rule 20, subd.
IV(D).

Ohio 1998.
Indigent murder defendant was not entitled to
additional state funds to obtain a second investigator
to critique the police investigation, where he did not
raise more than a mere possibility that such an expert
might have been relevant to the defense and he had
already been allowed state funds for an expert
investigator whose efforts helped produce over 30
defense witnesses. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14;
Const. Art. 1, § 16;
R.C. § 2929.024;
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D).
7. COSTS <e::=302.2(2)
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301. l Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forrna Pauperis
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence
102k302.2(2)
Expert witnesses or assistance in
general.
Ohio 1998.
Services of a state-funded mass-media expert were
not reasonably necessary for proper representation or
to guarantee the fairness of an indigent defendant's
U .S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14;
murder trial.
Const. Art. 1, § 16;
R.C. § 2929.024;
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D).
8. COSTS <e::=302.2(2)
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301. l Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forma Pauperis
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence
102k302.2(2)
Expert witnesses or assistance in
general.
Ohio 1998.
*144 Indigent defendant's case would not have been
helped by a state-funded firearms expert in a murder
prosecution in which a state's expert testified that a
metal piece found at the crime scene matched the
characteristics of a revolver which the victim's
husband owned and had apparently agreed to
exchange with defendant for a television, and thus it
was not an abuse of discretion to deny him such an

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works

82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, State v. Mason, (Ohio 1998)
expert, where the state's evidence simply showed an
observable similarity and was equally incriminating
against the husband. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14;
Const. Art. 1, § 16;
R.C. § 2929.024;
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D).
9. COSTS €:=302.4
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forma Pauperis
102k302.4
Medical or psychiatric witnesses or
assistance.
Ohio 1998.
Indigent defendant failed to show a need for a statefunded deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) statistical expert
in a murder prosecution in which the state introduced
DNA evidence, and thus the absence of one did not
make his trial unfair, where he did not dispute the
state's DNA test results. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5
, 14; Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024;
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D).

-

10.COSTS €:=302.4
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forma Pauperis
102k302.4
Medical or psychiatric witnesses or
assistance.
Ohio 1998.
Indigent murder defendant was not entitled to a
state-funded forensic psychologist, where his mental
status was not a central feature of the trial and where
he was allowed a state-funded psychiatrist whose
testimony he decided not to present for tactical
reasons. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Const.
Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; Superintendence
Rule 20, subd. IV(D).
11. COSTS €:=302.2(2)
102
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions
102k301. l Security for Payment; Proceedings in
Forma Pauperis
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence
102k302.2(2) Expert witnesses or assistance in
general.

-

Ohio 1998.
Indigent defendant was not entitled to the statefunded assistance of a social worker or mitigation
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expert in the penalty phase of his murder trial, where
his two lawyers and an investigator looked fully into
his background, the state turned over voluminous
records concerning him, and he deliberately chose not
to present background mitigation evidence to avoid
unfavorable rebuttal. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14
Const. Art. 1, § 16;
R.C. § 2929.024;
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D).
12.CRIMINAL LAW €:=414
110
l lOXVII Evidence
1lOXVII(M) Declarations
110k41 l
Declarations by Accused
110k414
Proof and effect.
Ohio 1998.
Evidence supported finding that a murder suspect
was not in custody, so as to trigger his right to a
Miranda warning, during two prearrest police-station
interviews.
13.CRIMINAL LAW €:=412.2(2)
110
l lOXVII Evidence
1lOXVII(M) Declarations
11Ok4l1
Declarations by Accused
110k412.2
Right to Counsel; Caution
110k412.2(2)
Accusatory stage of proceedings.
Ohio 1998.
Only a custodial interrogation triggers the need for a
Miranda warning.
14.CRIMINAL LAW €:=412.2(2)
110
l lOXVII Evidence
l lOXVII(M) Declarations
110k41 l
Declarations by Accused
110k412.2
Right to Counsel; Caution
110k412.2(2)
Accusatory stage of proceedings.
Ohio 1998.
Fact that a suspect is being interviewed at a police
station does not, per se, require a Miranda warning;
rather, the determination as to whether a custodial
interrogation has occurred requires an inquiry into
how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would
have understood his situation, with the ultimate
inquiry being simply whether there is a formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.
15.CRIMINAL LAW €:=412.1(1)

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, State v. Mason, (Ohio 1998)
110
1lOXVII Evidence
1lOXVII(M) Declarations
11 Ok411
Declarations by Accused
110k412. l
Voluntary Character of Statement
110k412. l(l)
In general.
Ohio 1998.
Totality of circumstances showed the voluntariness
of a murder suspect's professions of innocence during
two pretrial police-station interviews, where he was a
30-year-old high school graduate who had taken some
college courses, had two prior felony convictions, was
experienced with criminal investigations, was not
threatened, mistreated, coerced, or wrongfully
induced, was questioned for only 18 minutes in the
first interview, and enjoyed substantial periods of
inactivity during the second, four-hour interview.

-

16.CRIMINAL LAW €:=412.1(1)
110
1lOXVII Evidence
1lOXVII(M) Declarations
110k411
Declarations by Accused
110k412.1
Voluntary Character of Statement
110k412. l(l)
In general.
Ohio 1998.
Court determining whether a pretrial statement is
involuntary should consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior
criminal experience of the accused; the length,
intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence
of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the
existence of threat or inducement.
17.CRIMINAL LAW €:=590(1)
110
1lOXIX Continuance
110k588 Grounds for Continuance
Want of Preparation
110k590
In general.
110k590(1)
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his claim that he needed more time to investigate and
prepare for his murder trial, where he did not request
one until eight days before trial, was represented by
counsel for at least eight months before trial, received
state funds for several investigators and experts, got
additional help from the public defender's office, filed
more than 50 pretrial motions, conducted several
pretrial hearings, and called 31 trial witnesses.
18.CRIMINAL LAW €:=586
110
1lOXIX Continuance
110k586 Discretion of court.
Ohio 1998.
Grant or denial of continuance is a matter entrusted
to the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.
19.CRIMINAL LAW €:=1166.16
110
l lOXXIV Review
1lOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1lOkl166.5 Conduct of Trial in General
llOkl 166.16 Impaneling jury in general.
Ohio 1998.
Trial judge's and defense counsel's use during voir
dire of the term "recommendation" in reference to a
possible verdict of a life sentence in a murder trial,
though error because a jury recommendation of a life
sentence is binding on the trial court, was harmless
error, where the use of the term was brief and the
judge and counsel generally avoided it.
20.JURY €:=131(6)
230
Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and
230V
Objections
230k124 Challenges for Cause
Examination of Juror
230k131
Bias and prejudice.
230k131(6)
[See headnote text below]

[See headnote text below]
17.CRIMINAL LAW €:=605
110
1lOXIX Continuance
110k602
Application and Affidavits for
Continuance
110k605
Time for making.

20.JURY €:=131(13)
230
Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and
230V
Objections
230k124 Challenges for *144 Cause
230k131
Examination of Juror
230kl31(13) Mode of examination.

Ohio 1998.
Defendant was not wrongly denied a continuance on

Ohio 1998.
Defendant accused of interracial murder had an

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, State v. Mason, (Ohio 1998)
adequate opportunity to question prospective jurors on
racial attitudes, where before trial each juror was
given a 41-question, case-specific form which asked
about background, experiences, and attitudes, the trial
court allowed questioning about racial bias during
individual voir dire though it wanted to defer
extensive questioning until general voir dire, and
defense counsel asked about racial attitudes during
both individual and general voir dire, which extended
into three days. R.C. § 2945.27; Rules Crim.Pree.,
Rule 24(A).
21.JURY
230
230V

~131(4)

Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and
Objections
230kl24 Challenges for Cause
Examination of Juror
230kl31
Extent of examination.
230kl31(4)

Ohio 1998.
Scope of voir dire is within a trial court's discretion
and varies with the circumstances. R.C. § 2945.27;
Rules Crim.Pree., Rule 24(A).

-

22.JURY
230
230V

Page 5
l lOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
l lOkl 166.5 Conduct of Trial in General
l lOkl 166.22 Remarks of Judge
1lOkl166.22(2) Nature of remarks in general.

Ohio 1998.
Trial court's remarks about the efficacy and
propriety of the death penalty during voir dire in a
murder trial were improper, but the error was
harmless, where they were isolated remarks to single
jurors, the defense did not object, and the jury was
instructed to disregard any indication of the trial
court's view of the facts or the case.
24.CRIMINALLAW ~1144.15
llO
l lOXXIV Review
l lOXXIV(M) Presumptions
l 10k1144
Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by
Record
l 10k1144.15 Custody and conduct of jury.
Ohio 1998.
Unless it is proven otherwise, the jury is presumed
to follow instructions.

~131(6)

Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and
Objections
230kl24 Challenges for Cause
Examination of Juror
230kl31
Bias and prejudice.
230kl31(6)

Ohio 1998.
Whether prospective jurors' racial attitudes should
be covered in individual or general voir dire in an
interracial capital case is within the trial court's
discretion. R.C. § 2945.27; Rules Crim.Pree., Rule
24(A).
23.CRIMINAL LAW ~655(4)
110
llOXX Trial
11 OXX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in
General
Remarks and Conduct of Judge
l10k654
In General
l10k655
Remarks in selecting jury.
l 10k655(4)

25.CRIMINAL LAW ~722.3
llO
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l 10k722
Comments on Character or Conduct
l 10k722.3
Character, conduct, or appearance
in general.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor's reference to the "guilt phase" of the
trial in individual voir dire of six prospective jurors
did not create a presumption of guilt in a murder case,
especially since three of them did not sit as jurors and
the prosecutor explained to all that the first phase
dealt with determining guilt or innocence.
26.JURY
230
230V

~131(1)

Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and
Objections
230kl24 Challenges for Cause
Examination of Juror
230kl31
In general.
230kl31(1)

[See headnote text below]

-

23.CRIMINAL LAW ~1166.22(2)
110
llOXXIV Review

Ohio 1998.
During voir dire, the first phase of a bifurcated
capital case may be referred to as the "guilt phase" as
a convenient abbreviation, rather than using awkward

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, State v. Mason, (Ohio 1998)
terms such as the "guilt or innocence phase" or
"determination of guilt or innocence" phase.
27.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(2.1)
110
llOXX Trial
11 OXX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in
General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
11 Ok64 l. l 3 Adequacy of Representation
l 10k64 l.13(2) Particular Cases and Problems
l 10k64 l.l 3(2 .1) In general.
Ohio 1998.
Murder defendant failed to establish prejudice to
support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
during jury selection, where his complaints mostly
amounted to hindsight views about how current
counsel might have conducted voir dire differently.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

Page 6
230k30
Denial or Infringement of Right
230k33
Constitution and Selection of Jury
230k33(5)
Challenges and Objections
230k33(5.20)
Standing and waiver.

Ohio 1998.
Murder defendant waived his claim that the
prosecution improperly used peremptory challenges to
exclude prospective jurors based on their opposition to
the death penalty when he failed to ask for the state's
explanation.
31.JURY ~33(5.15)
230
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30
Denial or Infringement of Right
230k33
Constitution and Selection of Jury
230k33(5)
Challenges and Objections
230k33(5.15)
Peremptory challenges.
[See headnote text below]

-

28.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(1)
110
1lOXX Trial
Course and Conduct of Trial in
l lOXX(B)
General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
l 10k64 l .13
Adequacy of Representation
110k641.13(1) In general.
Ohio 1998.
Court evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel will not second-guess trial strategy decisions.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
29.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(1)
110
llOXX Trial
Course and Conduct of Trial in
1 lOXX(B)
General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
l 10k64 l. 13
Adequacy of Representation
l 10k641.13(1) In general.
Ohio 1998.
Court evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

-

30.JURY ~33(5.20)
230
230II Right to Trial by Jury

31.JURY
230
230V

~135

Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and
Objections
230k134 Peremptory Challenges
In general.
230k135

Ohio 1998.
Apart from excluding jurors based on race or sex,
prosecutors can exercise a peremptory challenge for
any reason, without inquiry, and without a court's
control.
32.JURY ~33(5.15)
230
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30
Denial or Infringement of Right
230k33
Constitution and Selection of Jury
230k33(5)
Challenges and Objections
230k33(5.15)
Peremptory challenges.
Ohio 1998.
Batson prohibition against peremptory strikes based
solely on race does not extend to peremptory strikes
against jurors opposed to the death penalty.
33.CRIMINAL LAW ~438(6)
110
l lOXVII Evidence
l lOXVII(P) Documentary Evidence
110k431
Private Writings and Publications
110k438
Photographs and Other Pictures

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, State v. Mason, (Ohio 1998)
110k438(5)
Depiction of Injuries or Dead
Bodies
110k438(6)
Purpose of admission.
[See headnote text below]
33.CRIMINAL LAW ~675
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(C) Reception of Evidence
110k675
Cumulative evidence in general.
Ohio 1998.
Six crime-scene photographs depicting the victim's
battered, bruised, and disrobed body, with her jeans
and panties pulled below her knees, were admissible
in a murder prosecution, where they were probative
of the state's theory that the victim struggled and was
raped, illustrated coroner and police testimony, were
small in size, and were not particularly gruesome or
inflammatory, though two of them were cumulative.
Rules of Evid., Rule 403.

-

34.CRIMINAL LAW ~438(6)
*144 110
1 lOXVII Evidence
1lOXVII(P) Documentary Evidence
110k431
Private Writings and Publications
110k438
Photographs and Other Pictures
110k438(5)
Depiction of Injuries or Dead
Bodies
110k438(6)
Purpose of admission.
Ohio 1998.
Three autopsy photographs portraying the victim's
injuries were admissible in a murder prosecution,
where they were relevant to prove intent to kill,
illustrated coroner and police testimony, were small in
size, and were not particularly gruesome or
inflammatory. Rules of Evid., Rule 403.
35.CRIMINAL LAW ~438(1)
110
1lOXVII Evidence
1lOXVII(P) Documentary Evidence
110k431
Private Writings and Publications
110k438
Photographs and Other Pictures
110k438(1)
In general.

-

Ohio 1998.
Admission of photographs is left to a trial court's
sound discretion. Rules of Evid., Rule 403.
36.CRIMINAL LAW ~438(7)
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110
1lOXVII Evidence
1lOXVIl(P) Documentary Evidence
110k431
Private Writings and Publications
110k438
Photographs and Other Pictures
110k438(7)
Photographs arousing passion or
prejudice; gruesomeness.
Ohio 1998.
Relevant, nonrepetitive photographs are admissible
in capital cases, even if gruesome, as long as the
probative value of each photograph outweighs the
danger of material prejudice. Rules of Evid., Rule
403.
37.CRIMINAL LAW ~1168(2)
110
1lOXXIV Review
llOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1lOkl168
Rulings as to Evidence in General
1lOkl168(2) Reception of evidence.
Ohio 1998.
Though two of six otherwise admissible crime-scene
photos were cumulative, the error in admitting both
was harmless, in a prosecution for murder. Rules of
Evid., Rule 403.
38.CRIMINAL LAW ~1036.1(6)
110
1lOXXIV Review
l lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
llOXXIV(E)l In General
110kl036
Evidence
110k1036.1
In General
110kl036.1(3)
Particular Evidence
110k1036.1(6)
Documentary evidence.
Ohio 1998.
State's use of transcripts, in addition to tapes, of
police interviews portraying a black murder
defendant's use of ethnic language was not plain
error, where defendant did not claim that the
transcripts were inaccurate and the jury knew about
his occasional use of ethnic language from listening to
the tapes.
39.CRIMINAL LAW ~1043(3)
110
1lOXXIV Review
1lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
1 lOXXIV (E) 1 In General
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110k1043
Scope and Effect of Objection
110k1043(3)
Adding to or changing grounds of
objection.
Ohio 1998.
Black murder defendant waived error as to the
state's use of transcripts, in addition to tapes, of
police interviews accurately portraying his use of
ethnic language, where he failed to object to use of
the transcripts on this basis although he had the
transcripts and knew of their intended use; had the
issue been timely raised, revisions to the transcript
might have been made.
Rules of Evid., Rule
103(A)(I).
40.CRIMINAL LAW <e:=858(3)
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(J) Issues Relating to Jury Trial
110k858
Taking Papers or Articles to Jury
Room
I 10k858(3)
Documents or demonstrative
evidence.
Ohio 1998.
Transcripts of a murder defendant's police
interviews could be allowed in the jury room even
though tapes of the interviews had been admitted into
evidence, where they were useful and easier to
understand than the tapes and the court carefully
instructed the jurors that they were merely a listening
aid and were to be disregarded if they conflicted with
the tapes.
41.HOMICIDE <e:=178(1)
203
203VII Evidence
203VIl(B) Admissibility in General
203kl 78
Incriminating Others
203kl 78(1)
In general.
Ohio 1998.
Exclusion from a murder trial of evidence of prior
specific violent acts by the victim's husband, who
defendant claimed was the killer, did not violate
defendant's constitutional rights, where the evidence
was inadmissible under the rule generally prohibiting
character evidence and defendant was allowed to
present other evidence that tended to show the
husband's criminal propensity, including questioning
of the husband about his heavy drinking and his fights
with the victim. Rules of Evid., Rules 404, 404(A).
42.HOMICIDE <e:=178(1)
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203
203VII Evidence
203VIl(B) Admissibility in General
203k178
Incriminating Others
203kl78(1)
In general.

Ohio 1998.
Evidence that the victim's husband had allegedly
committed specific acts of violence was inadmissible
in a murder trial under the rule generally prohibiting
the use of character evidence to prove actions in
conformity therewith. Rules of Evid., Rules 404,
404(A).
43.CRIMINAL LAW <e:=338(4)
110
1 lOXVII Evidence
1lOXVII(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance
110k338
Relevancy in General
110k338(4)
Evidence as to acts, transactions,
and occurrences to which accused is not
a party.
Ohio 1998.
Rule generally prohibiting the use of character
evidence to prove actions in conformity therewith
applies to all character evidence, including that
relating to witnesses or alternative suspects; it is not
limited simply to persons accused of crimes. Rules of
Evid., Rules 404, 404(A).
44.CRIMINAL LAW <e:=1172.8
110
l lOXXIV Review
1lOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
I lOkll 72
Instructions
1lOkl172.8
Effect of verdict or determination.
Ohio 1998.
Instructing the jury that it had to determine that
defendant was not guilty of aggravated murder before
considering whether he was guilty of murder was
harmless error if it was error at all, where the jury
found defendant guilty of raping the victim.
45.CRIMINAL LAW <e:=l038.1(3.l)
110
l lOXXIV Review
l lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
llOXXIV(E)l In General
110kl038
Instructions
110kl038.1
Objections in General
1lOk 103 8. 1(3)
Particular Instructions
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110kl038.1(3 .1)

In general.

Ohio 1998.
By failing to object at trial, defendant waived all but
plain error as to an instruction which told the jury that
it had to determine if defendant was not guilty of
aggravated murder before considering whether he was
guilty of murder. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 30(A).
46.CRIMINAL LAW <P713
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
11 Ok713
In general.
Ohio 1998.
Determination of whether improper remarks
constitute prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct
requires analysis as to (1) whether the remarks were
improper, and (2) if so, whether the remarks
prejudicially affected the accused's substantial rights.

-

47.CRIMINAL LAW <P720(5)
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
110k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
110k720(5)
Credibility and character of
witnesses.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor's comments during cross-examination of
a murder defendant about inconsistencies between his
pretrial statements and his trial testimony did not
penalize defendant for exercising his rights or
constitute *144 prosecutorial misconduct.
48.CRIMINAL LAW <P1037.1(2)
110
llOXXIV Review
1lOXXIV (E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
1lOXXIV (E) 1 In General
110kl037
Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
In General
110kl037 .1
11 Okl037 .1 (2)
Particular statements,
arguments, and comments.
Ohio 1998.
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Although the prosecutor may have denigrated
defense counsel during final guilt-phase argument in a
murder trial by remarking that counsel "tried to cloud
the issues, tried to confuse," this was not plain error,
where the prosecutor's argument when viewed in its
total context was reasoned, logical, and not emotional.
49.CRIMINAL LAW <P1037.1(2)
110
1lOXXIV Review
11 OXXIV (E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
1lOXXIV(E)l In General
110k1037
Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110kl037.1
In General
110k1037 .1(2)
Particular statements,
arguments, and comments.
Ohio 1998.
By not objecting to any of the prosecutor's final
guilt-phase argument, defendant waived all but plain
error as to the prosecutor's remark during the
argument that defense counsel "tried to cloud the
issues, tried to confuse." Rules Crim. Proc., Rule
52(B).
SO.CRIMINAL LAW <P720(9)
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
110k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
110k720(7)
Inferences from and Effect of
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions
110k720(9)
Homicide.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor during final guilt-phase argument in a
murder trial could point out the weakness in defense
claims that defendant and the victim were romantically
involved.
51.CRIMINAL LAW <P720(9)
110
llOXX Trial
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
110k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
110k720(7)
Inferences from and Effect of
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions
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110k720(9)

Homicide.

[See headnote text below]
51.CRIMINAL LAW ~726
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l 10k726
Retaliatory statements and remarks.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor during final guilt-phase argument in a
murder trial could remark on the inconsistency
between defendant's attack on eyewitness testimony
and his own reliance upon doubtful eyewitness
testimony.

-

52.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(6)
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l 10k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
l 10k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
110k720(6)
Inferences from and effect of
evidence in general.

54.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(6)
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l 10k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
l 10k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
Inferences from and effect of
l 10k720(6)
evidence in general.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor may state his Oplllon during closing
argument if it is based on the evidence presented at
trial.
55.CRIMINAL LAW ~719(3)
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
l 10k712
and Arguments
l 10k719
Matters Not Sustained by Evidence
110k719(3)
Personal knowledge, opinion, or
belief of counsel.
[See headnote text below]

Ohio 1998.
Prosecutors are entitled to latitude in closing
argument as to what the evidence has shown and what
inferences can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence.
53.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9)
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l 10k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
l 10k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
11 Ok720(7)
Inferences from and Effect of
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions
l 10k720(9)
Homicide.

-
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Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor's remark during final guilt-phase
argument in a murder trial that the defendant's
testimony that police planted his keys in the victim's
car was "preposterous" was not improper, where
crime-scene photographs and the ensuing disassembly
of the car proved that police did not plant this
evidence.

55.CRIMINAL LAW ~726
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k726
Retaliatory statements and remarks.
Ohio 1998.
Although the prosecutor improperly vouched for the
police during final guilt-phase argument in a murder
trial by asserting that they "did an outstanding job" in
their investigation, the error was not prejudicial,
particularly in light of defense counsel's repeated
criticism of the police investigation.
56.CRIMINAL LAW ~726
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k726
Retaliatory statements and remarks.
[See headnote text below]
56.CRIMINAL LAW
110
llOXX Trial

~728(2)
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11 OXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k728
Objections and Exceptions
110k728(2)
Necessity.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor's statement during closing argument that
is not supported by admitted evidence is not prejudical
error, where it is short, oblique, and justified as a
reply to defense arguments and elicits no
contemporaneous objection.
57.CRIMINAL LAW ~1037.1(1)
110
1lOXXIV Review
1lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
llOXXIV(E)l In General
110kl037
Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k1037 .1
In General
110kl037.l(l)
Arguments and conduct in
general.

-

Ohio 1998.
By failing to object to the prosecutor's remarks
during final penalty-phase argument, murder
Rules
defendant waived all but plain error.
Crim. Proc., Rule 52(B).
58.CRIMINAL LAW ~723(2)
110
l lOXX Trial
1lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l l0k722
Comments on Character or Conduct
11 Ok723
Appeals to Sympathy or Prejudice
110k723(2)
Reference to character of offense.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a
murder trial could legitimately refer to the nature and
circumstances of the offense, both to refute any
suggestion that they were mitigating and to explain
why
the
specified aggravating circumstance
outweighed mitigating factors.

-

59.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9)
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l 10k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
110k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
11 Ok720(7)
Inferences from and Effect of
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions
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110k720(9)

Homicide.

Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a
murder trial could properly minimize the importance
of defendant's good conduct in jail, his artistic ability,
and family opinions that he should avoid the death
penalty.
60.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9)
110
l lOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l 10k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
110k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
l 10k720(7)
Inferences from and Effect of
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions
110k720(9)
Homicide.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a
murder trial could properly comment upon the paucity
of relevant mitigating evidence.
61.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(6)
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
l 10k712
and Arguments
110k720 *144
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
l 10k720(6)
Inferences from and effect of
evidence in general.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutors during final penalty-phase argument can
urge the merits of their cause and legitimately argue
that defense mitigation evidence is worthy of little or
no weight.
62.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9)
110
llOXX Trial
11 OXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
l 10k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
110k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
l 10k720(7)
Inferences from and Effect of
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions
110k720(9)
Homicide.
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Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a
murder trial could comment that defense explanations
seemed "far fetched," where defendant relied upon
residual doubt.
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110k733
110k741

Questions of Law or of Fact
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
in General
110k741(1)
In general.
[See headnote text below]

63.CRIMINAL LAW ~726
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k726
Retaliatory statements and remarks.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument can
respond to issues raised by defendant.

-

64.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9)
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k712
Statements as to Facts, Comments,
and Arguments
110k720
Comments on Evidence or
Witnesses
110k720(7)
Inferences from and Effect of
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions
l 10k720(9)
Homicide.
Ohio 1998.
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a
murder trial did not exceed limits by noting that
defendant made an unswom statement on which he
could not be cross-examined.
65.CRIMINAL LAW ~1144.13(3)
110
1lOXXIV Review
llOXXIV(M) Presumptions
1lOkl144
Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by
Record
1lOkl144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
l lOkl 144.13(2) Construction of Evidence
l 10k1144.13(3)
Construction in favor of
government, state, or prosecution.
Ohio 1998.
In a review for sufficiency following a conviction,
the evidence must be considered in a light most
favorable to the prosecution.

-

66.CRIMINAL LAW ~741(1)
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General

66.CRIMINAL LAW ~742(1)
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General
110k733
Questions of Law or of Fact
110k742
Credibility of Witnesses
110k742(1)
In general.
Ohio 1998.
Weight to be given the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses is primarily for the trier of fact.
67.HOMICIDE ~235
203
203VII Evidence
203VIl(E) Weight and Sufficiency
203k235
Commission of or attempt to commit
other offense.
[See headnote text below]
67.HOMICIDE ~358(1)
203
203XI Sentence and Punishment
203k358 Sentencing Procedure
203k358(1) In general.
[See headnote text below]
67.RAPE ~51(3)
321
321II Prosecution
321Il(B) Evidence
321k50
Weight and Sufficiency
321k51
In General
321k51(3)
Carnal knowledge.
Ohio 1998.
Evidence that defendant's semen was in the victim's
body supported the element of sexual penetration for
the offense of rape, the offense of aggravated felonymurder based upon rape, and a death-penalty
specification alleging rape.
68.HOMICIDE ~235
203
203VII Evidence
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203VIl(E) Weight and Sufficiency
203k235
Commission of or attempt to commit
other offense.
[See headnote text below]
68. HOMICIDE ~358(1)
203
203XI Sentence and Punishment
203k358 Sentencing Procedure
203k358(1) In general.
[See headnote text below]
68.RAPE ~51(4)
321
32111 Prosecution
32lll(B) Evidence
321k50
Weight and Sufficiency
321k51
In General
321k51(4)
Force, nonconsent, and resistance.

-

Ohio 1998.
Evidence that there was a struggle in the victim's
car, that her jeans and panties were found pulled
down below her knees, and that she had been both
strangled and beaten supported the element of force
for the offense of rape, the offense of aggravated
felony-murder based upon rape, and a death-penalty
specification alleging rape.
69.HOMICIDE ~234(8)
203
203VII Evidence
203VIl(E) Weight and Sufficiency
203k234
Commission of or Participation in Act
by Accused
203k234(8)
Conclusiveness of particular
circumstances.
Ohio 1998.
Testimony of the state's witnesses about defendant's
activities on the day of the victim's disappearance
supported the jury's conclusion that he was the one
who battered and killed the victim, notwithstanding
defendant's contrary testimony.
70.CRIMINAL LAW ~1035(6)
110
l lOXXIV Review
l lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
llOXXIV(E)l In General
110k1035
Proceedings at Trial in General
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110kl035(6)

Summoning and impaneling jury.

Ohio 1998.
Preliminary voir dire instructions which stated that a
sentencing hearing would be held if defendant were
found guilty, but did not further explain how the jury
would determine whether to recommend death and
implied that a finding of guilty on any charge could
warrant the death penalty, was not plain error.
71.CRIMINAL LAW ~1035(6)
110
l lOXXIV Review
l lOXXIV (E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
l lOXXIV (E) 1 In General
110kl035
Proceedings at Trial in General
110kl035(6)
Summoning and impaneling jury.
Ohio 1998.
By not contemporaneously objecting to preliminary
voir dire instructions, defendant waived all but plain
error.
72.CRIMINAL LAW ~822(1)
110
llOXX Trial
1 lOXX(G)
Instructions: Necessity, Requisites,
and Sufficiency
110k822
Construction and Effect of Charge as
a Whole
110k822(1)
In general.
Ohio 1998.
Failure of penalty-phase instructions to define the
term "mitigating factors" was not error, where the
instructions, considered as a whole, adequately guided
the jury and did not restrict its consideration of
mitigating evidence.
73.CRIMINAL LAW ~1137(2)
110
l lOXXIV Review
l lOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
l lOkl 135
Parties Entitled to Allege Error
l lOkl 137
Estoppel
Error committed or invited by
l lOkl 137(2)
party complaining in general.
[See headnote text below]

in
73.HOMICIDE ~358(1)
203
203XI Sentence and Punishment
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203k358 Sentencing Procedure
203k358(1) In general.
Ohio 1998.
Penalty-phase jury could consider testimony and
exhibits admitted into evidence in the guilt phase,
especially since defendant invited reconsideration of
all guilt-phase evidence by relying upon residual doubt
in arguing against the death penalty.
74.HOMICIDE ~311
203
203VIII Trial
203VIIl(C) Instructions
203k31 l
Punishment.

-

Ohio 1998.
Penalty-phase instruction telling the jury that
defendant's right to appeal would not be limited by a
death sentence and that the jury should not consider
the subject of appeal was appropriate, where
defendant provoked the instruction with his unsworn
statement declaring his wish to receive a life sentence
"so I will have a chance to bring this to Appeal
Courts."
75.HOMICIDE ~325
203
203X
Appeal and Error
Presentation and reservation in lower
203k325
court of grounds of review.
Ohio 1998.
References in penalty-phase instructions *144 to
"aggravating circumstances" when only a single
aggravating circumstance existed was not plain error,
particularly since the trial court identified for the jury
a single aggravating circumstance of felony-murder.
76.HOMICIDE ~311
203
203VIII Trial
203VIII(C) Instructions
203k3 l l
Punishment.
Ohio 1998.
Penalty-phase instruction on mercy need not be
given.

-

77.CRIMINAL LAW ~796
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(G)
Instructions: Necessity, Requisites,
and Sufficiency
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l 10k796

Punishment.

Ohio 1998.
Penalty-phase instruction on residual doubt need not
be given.
78.CRIMINAL LAW ~956(13)
110
l lOXXI Motions for New Trial
l 10k948 Application for New Trial
l 10k956
Affidavits and Other Proofs in
General
110k956(13)
Sufficiency of proofs as to
misconduct of or affecting jurors.
Ohio 1998.
Evidence that some members of an all-white jury
made racist remarks did not show that the jury was
racially prejudiced or that the defendant, who was
black, was denied a fair trial, where the overall record
suggested that any such remarks were isolated and 11
jurors gave affidavits denying that they had
participated in or observed any racism.
79.CRIMINAL LAW ~865(1.5)
110
llOXX Trial
l lOXX(J) Issues Relating to Jury Trial
l 10k865
Urging or Coercing Agreement
"Allen," "dynamite,"
110k865(1.5)
"hammer," etc., charge.

or

Ohio 1998.
After the trial court learned that the penalty-phase
jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, it did
not have to tell the jury to limit itself to life-sentence
options, and could instead give a modified Howard
charge urging the jury to continue deliberations,
where the jury had been deliberating for only four and
one-half hours and the circumstances did not show an
irreconcilable deadlock.
SO.CRIMINAL LAW ~872.5
110
1 lOXX Trial
l lOXX(K) Verdict
l 10k872.5 Assent of required number of jurors.
Ohio 1998.
When a jury becomes irreconcilably deadlocked
during its capital sentencing deliberations, the trial
court must impose an appropriate life sentence.
81.CRIMINAL LAW ~865(1.5)
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110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(J) Issues Relating to Jury Trial
l 10k865
Urging or Coercing Agreement
110k865(1.5)
"Allen," "dynamite,"
"hammer," etc., charge.

or

Ohio 1998.
No exact line can be drawn as to how long a
penalty-phase jury must deliberate before the trial
court should instruct it to limit itself to the life
sentence options or take the case away from the jury;
each case must be decided based upon the particular
circumstances.
82.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ~268(11)
92
92XII Due Process of Law
92k256
Criminal Prosecutions
92k268
Trial
92k268(2)
Particular Cases and Problems
92k268(1 l)
Instructions.

-

Ohio 1998.
Supplemental instructions urging jurors who are
considering the death penalty to continue deliberations
to try to reach a unanimous verdict do not violate due
process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
83.CRIMINAL LAW ~956(13)
110
1lOXXI Motions for New Trial
110k948 Application for New Trial
110k956
Affidavits and Other Proofs in
General
110k956(13)
Sufficiency of proofs as to
misconduct of or affecting jurors.
Ohio 1998.
Defendant's evidence at a posttrial hearing on his
motion for a new trial showed no prejudice from
asserted misconduct by the penalty-phase jury. Rules
Crim.Proc., Rule 33(A).
84.CRIMINAL LAW ~957(3)
110
1lOXXI Motions for New Trial
110k948 Application for New Trial
Statements, Affidavits, and Testimony
l 10k957
of Jurors
110k957(3)
Misconduct of jurors, in general.

-

Ohio 1998.
Defendant could not inquire into the deliberations of
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the penalty-phase jury to support his posttrial motion
for a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct,
where he presented no evidence of outside influences
so as to avoid the aliunde rule of evidence. Rules of
Evid., Rule 606(B).
85.CRIMINAL LAW ~957(1)
110
1lOXXI Motions for New Trial
110k948 Application for New Trial
110k957
Statements, Affidavits, and Testimony
of Jurors
110k957(1)
In general.
Ohio 1998.
Aliunde rule, which limits evidence about jury
deliberations, has no exception for murder cases.
Rules of Ev id., Rule 606(B).
86.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(6)
110
1lOXX Trial
llOXX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in
General
11 Ok641
Counsel for Accused
11 Ok641.13
Adequacy of Representation
110k641.13(2) Particular Cases and Problems
110k641.13(6)
Evidence; procurement,
presentation and objections.
Ohio 1998.
Murder defendant's counsel was not ineffective for
telling the jury that defendant was on parole when he
was arrested and that his parole was thereafter
revoked, where the disclosure may have served the
tactical purpose of supporting a "rush to judgment"
theory and the state inevitably would have proved
defendant's
felony
convictions.
U .S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.
87.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(7)
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in
General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
11Ok64l.l3
Adequacy of Representation
110k641.13(2) Particular Cases and Problems
110k641.13(7)
Post-trial procedure and review.
Ohio 1998.
Murder defendant's counsel was not ineffective
during the penalty phase for failing to present
mitigating evidence concerning defendant's life history
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and psychological background, where counsel made
the strategic decision to withhold the evidence to
avoid damaging
rebuttal
evidence
including
defendant's criminal and juvenile histories. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

203XI Sentence and Punishment
203k355 Death Penalty
Considerations Determining Propriety
203k357
of Death Sentence
203k357(7)
Commission of other offense.

88.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(7)
110
llOXX Trial
1lOXX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in
General
l 10k641
Counsel for Accused
11 Ok64 l. l 3 Adequacy of Representation
110k641.13(2) Particular Cases and Problems
110k641.13(7)
Post-trial procedure and review.

Ohio 1998.
Death sentence was neither excessive nor
disproportionate punishment for a defendant who was
convicted of *144 raping, strangling, and fatally
beating his victim and who presented minimal
mitigating factors.

Ohio 1998.
Murder defendant's counsel was not ineffective
during the penalty phase for making the strategic
decision to refrain from presenting the video
deposition of a psychiatrist in order to avoid rebuttal
evidence about defendant's behavioral problems,
character deficiencies, and poor potential for
rehabilitation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
89.HOMICIDE ~357(4)
203
203XI Sentence and Punishment
203k355 Death Penalty
Considerations Determining Propriety
203k357
of Death Sentence
203k357(4)
Aggravation or mitigation in
general.
[See headnote text below]
89.HOMICIDE ~357(7)
203
203XI Sentence and Punishment
203k355 Death Penalty
Considerations Determining Propriety
203k357
of Death Sentence
203k357(7)
Commission of other offense.
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Ohio 1998.
Felony-murder aggravating circumstance, namely,
that the defendant had raped, strangled, and fatally
beaten his victim, outweighed the mitigating factors,
which consisted of his family members' love for him,
his possible artistic talent, and his adjustment to jail;
thus, a death sentence was appropriate.
90.HOMICIDE
203

~357(7)

SYUABUS BY THE COURT

Due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution, requires that an indigent criminal
defendant be provided funds to obtain expert
assistance at state expense only where the trial court
finds, in the *145 exercise of a sound discretion, that
the defendant has made a particularized showing (1)
of a reasonable probability that the requested expert
would aid in his defense, and (2) that denial of the
requested expert assistance would result in an unfair
trial. (State v. Broom [1988], 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533
N .E.2d 682, approved and followed.)
[694 N.E.2d 940] On February 13, 1993, sheriff's
deputies found the battered body of nineteen-year-old
Robin Dennis inside an abandoned building in a rural
area of Marion County near Pole Lane Road. Robin,
lying face down, was wearing only a bra. Her jeans
and panties were positioned around her ankles and
lower leg. Eight feet from Robin's body detectives
found her jacket, with burrs and debris on it. Her Tshirt and car keys were under the coat.
The apparent murder weapon, a blood-stained board
with protruding nails, was lying some twenty feet
from her body. Hair adhering to another piece of
wood found at the scene matched Robin's hair.
After an autopsy, pathologist Dr. Keith Norton
concluded that Robin died as a result of blunt force
trauma causing multiple skull fractures. Dr. Norton
found eight distinct lacerations on Robin's head.
Robin also suffered a black eye and bruises on her
head, face, and body.
She had been strangled,
possibly causing unconsciousness, but she did not die
of strangulation. In Dr. Norton's view, the bloodstained board found at the scene could have caused
her injuries, but some injuries may also have been
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caused by the butt of a revolver.
Dr. Norton found no trauma to the victim's
genitalia, but he found sperm in her vagina. He
testified that sperm can remain six to twelve hours
after intercourse in the vagina of a woman doing
normal activities.
According to DNA experts called by the state,
material taken with vaginal swabs from the victim
matched the DNA of appellant Maurice Mason. As to
this material, a DNA match could be expected from
only one in eight thousand three hundred people of the
same race as Mason. DNA material from Robin's
panties also matched Mason's DNA, and the odds
against a similar DNA match among individuals of his
race were four million to one. Roughly comparable
odds existed as to other races. Experts did not find [
694 N.E.2d 941] DNA from anyone other than the
victim and Mason.

-

Dr. Richard Durbin, the coroner who examined the
body at the scene, believed Robin had been killed at
the scene and had been dead for several days. From
*146
her appearance and injuries, Dr. Durbin
thought Robin had been raped or sexually molested.
Robin's body was found within eighteen minutes'
walking distance of where her abandoned car had
been found stuck in a farm field three days earlier.
On the inside of the passenger door, a police
technician found type B blood, Robin's blood type.
On the outside passenger car door and on the
passenger's side of the dash, a forensic investigator
found what appeared to be chevron style tennis shoe
impressions. The state established that Mason owned
shoes bearing similar chevron designs and that Robin
Dennis's shoes with a similar chevron design were
found at the crime scene. The prosecutor later argued
that the location of the marks and blood inside the car
were consistent with a struggle having taken place in
and around the car.
A set of keys, including car keys that fit a 1981
Chrysler belonging to Mason's wife, were on the
car's front passenger seat.

-

Thomas Forster, a farmer, testified that he saw a
person fitting Mason's description walking in his
fields towards Pole Lane Road around 4: 10 p.m. on
February 8, the date of Robin's disappearance. That
location was a seven-to-nine-minute walk from the
building where Robin's body was later found, and
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approximately a seventy-minute walk from where
Mason lived. The man Forster observed was black,
weighed about two hundred pounds, and was wearing
jeans, a jacket, and a bandanna on his head. Mason is
black, weighed two hundred fifteen pounds, and was
wearing a bandanna earlier that day.
Around 4: 15 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Jack Lautenslager
noticed a black man walking along Pole Lane Road.
The man was wearing a dark jacket and a blue
bandanna with white specks.
Lautenslager later
identified Mason as the man he saw on February 8 by
choosing his photo from a group of five or six photos.
Around 4:30 p.m. that same afternoon, Francis
Forster, Jr., farmer Forster's brother, noticed a lightcolored compact car in a field near New Road. Two
days later, on February 10, Forster saw sheriff's
deputies inspecting the same car, still in the field.
On February 15, detectives found a small bloodstained piece of metal at the crime scene. A firearms
examiner concluded that this piece of metal was
identical in size, shape, and design to a grip-frame
from a Colt .22 caliber Frontier Scout Revolver and
was consistent with having come from the handle of
such a revolver. A similar weapon had been the
subject of an agreement between Robin's husband and
Mason under which the gun would be traded for
Mason's television.
*147 A technician found type B blood, Robin's
blood type, on the side of a tennis shoe Mason was
Approximately eleven
wearing on February 12.
percent of Caucasians and twenty percent of blacks
have type B blood.

Trial testimony established Robin's activities prior to
her death. On February 7, Robin and her husband,
Chris Dennis, drove to the home of friends Mike and
Carol Young in Marion and stayed overnight. Chris
brought a Colt .22 caliber Frontier Scout revolver
with him.
On February 8, Robin and Chris went to the Marion
office of H & R Block. Later they stopped at the
home of Rick McDuffie, whom Chris knew. Mason,
who was acquainted with the victim's husband and
was McDuffie's cousin, also was present at the
McDuffie house.
According to the testimony of
several state witnesses, Robin, Chris and Mason later
returned together to the Young house.
While there, Chris and Mason discussed trading
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Chris's Colt revolver for Mason's TV. State witnesses
testified that Mason and Robin left the Youngs' house
in Robin's car around 3:00 p.m. on February 8 to
pick up Mason's television set. Before Robin and
Mason left, Chris passed out intoxicated in the living
room of the Youngs' house and did not awake until
later that evening after they were gone.

indicate that Mason's keys were the keys found in
Robin's car that day. Also, on February 11, police
towed the car to a city garage and, on February 12,
disassembled the car (door, seats and dash removed).
Since the car was never reassembled, the photos could
not have been taken after the February 12
disassembly.

[694 N.E.2d 942] Robin never returned, and Chris
Dennis's gun was never seen again. Despite Mason's
admission that he discussed trading his television for
the gun with Chris, he claimed that the trade never
occurred and that he never had the gun.

Mason claimed that he did not, on February 8, wear
the tennis shoes introduced as evidence by the state.
He testified that his brothers and father had also worn
his shoes. He theorized that the blood found on his
shoe might have come from his father. He testified
that he had previously worked at a slaughterhouse,
and he speculated that the blood may have come from
coworkers at a slaughterhouse who had cut themselves
and might have bled on his shoes.

Mason's testimony as to his activities on the date of
Robin's disappearance conflicted with that of the
state's witnesses. Mason testified that he first met
Robin in September 1992, and that they had spent a
night together and engaged in consensual sex. He
claimed that they had had sex a few times since then.
He testified that on the date Robin disappeared, he
had consensual sex with her around 10:30 a.m. at
Rick McDuffie's house, and that later Chris and
Robin dropped him off at his home around 3:00 p.m.,
after which he went walking, and that he never saw
Robin after that.
Mason said that between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. on that
day, he visited Gerald Gorham at a laundromat, and
drank with him at a park. Gorham corroborated
Mason's visit, but did not know on which day it
occurred.
Sandy Childers testified that she saw Mason after
5:00 p.m., when he was out walking, then picked him
up around 5:20 p.m. and drove him to his home.
Mason later walked over to Sandy's, where he spent
the evening, and others confirmed that Mason arrived
at Sandy's between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.
Mason admitted that he had initially told police that
he was home after 2:30 p.m. on February 8, and that
when his wife came home at 4: 15 p.m., they went to
*148 the YMCA. He also initially denied to police
that he had ever been alone with Robin.
At trial Mason admitted that the keys discovered in
Robin's abandoned vehicle were his, but claimed that
police took them from him when he was taken into
custody on February 12, 1993. Police inventory
records, however, indicated that Mason had no keys
with him on February 12.
Moreover, February 10 photos of the car's interior

Mason denied that he had been in the vicinity of the
crime scene on February 8, and denied killing Robin.
On cross-examination, Mason asserted, "I didn't kill
her, and her husband [Chris Dennis] did. I know
that. You know that, and everybody else knows
that."
In 1984, Mason had been convicted of burglary and
thus had a prior conviction for an offense of violence
and could not legally possess firearms. In 1988,
Mason was also convicted of drug trafficking.
Mason was indicted, tried by jury, and convicted of
aggravated felony murder, rape, and having a weapon
while under disability. He was further found guilty of
the death-penalty specification of committing murder
in the course of a rape, and further specifications
involving firearms, prior felony, and prior offense of
violence.
Thereafter the jury returned a
recommendation that he be sentenced to death, and
that recommendation was accepted by the trial court.
The court of appeals affirmed Mason's convictions
and death sentence, and the cause is now before this
court upon an appeal as of right.
Jim Slagle, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney,
for appellee.
William F. Kluge, Lima, and David C. Stebbins,
Columbus, for appellant.
MOYER, Chief Justice.
Mason has raised twenty-two propositions of law.
We have reviewed each, and, for the reasons stated
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below, we find that none justifies[694 N.E.2d 943]
*149 reversal of Mason's convictions. We have
fulfilled our responsibilities to independently review
the record, weigh the aggravating circumstances
against the mitigating factors, and examine the
proportionality of a sentence of death in this case.
Upon full review of the record, we affirm Mason's
convictions and death sentence.

proceeding if the assistance is not provided. Ake at
78-79, 105 S.Ct. at 1093-1094, 84 L.Ed.2d at 63.
Pursuant to the third of these factors, due process
does not require the provision of expert assistance
relevant to an issue that is not likely to be significant
at trial. Nor does due process require that an indigent
defendant be provided all the assistance that a
wealthier counterpart might buy. Rather, he or she is
entitled only to the basic and integral tools necessary
to ensure a fair trial.

Denial of Experts

*150 Due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution, does not require the government to
provide expert assistance to an indigent defendant in
the absence of a particularized showing of need. Nor
does it require the government to provide expert
assistance to an indigent criminal defendant upon
mere demand of the defendant. We observed in State
v. Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 283, 533
N.E.2d 682, 691, that, pursuant to Ake and its
progeny, in order to establish a violation of due
process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, " 'a
defendant must show more than a mere possibility of
assistance from an expert. Rather, a defendant must
show a reasonable probability that an expert would aid
in his defense, and that denial of expert assistance
would result in an unfair trial.' " Quoting Little v.
Armantrout (C.A.8, 1987), 835 F.2d 1240, 1244.

Mason argues that the trial court violated his
constitutional and statutory rights by failing to provide
adequate funds for investigative and expert assistance,
despite the fact that he was provided funds for
obtaining the services of a private investigator, a
forensic psychiatrist, and a forensic pathologist, and
for blood and DNA testing. He contends that the trial
court should have also provided funds to enable him
to hire (a) a soils and trace evidence expert, (b) an
expert on shoeprints, (c) an eyewitness identification
expert, (d) a social worker or mitigation expert, (e) a
homicide investigation expert, (f) a mass media
expert, (g) a forensic psychologist, (h) a statistical
DNA expert, and (i) a firearms expert.
[l] As a matter of due process, indigent defendants
are entitled to receive the "raw materials" and the "
'basic tools of an adequate defense,' " which may
include provision of expert psychiatric assistance.
Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S.Ct.
1087, 1093, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 62 (quoting Britt v. North
Carolina [1971), 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431,
433-434, 30 L.Ed.2d 400, 403). The Ake court held
that provision of an expert to a defendant was
required when necessary to prepare an effective
defense based on his mental condition, when his
sanity at the time is seriously in question.

-
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While Ake involved the provision of expert
psychiatric assistance only, the case now is generally
recognized to support the proposition that due process
may require that a criminal defendant be provided
other types of expert assistance when necessary to
present an adequate defense. Pursuant to Ake, it is
appropriate to consider three factors in determining
whether the provision of an expert witness is required:
(1) the effect on the defendant's private interest in the
accuracy of the trial if the requested service is not
provided, (2) the burden on the government's interest
if the service is provided, and (3) the probable value
of the additional service and the risk of error in the

Further, as a matter of statutory law, R.C. 2929.024
requires trial judges to grant funds in aggravated
murder cases for investigative services and experts
when "reasonably necessary for the proper
representation" of indigent defendants.
Such
decisions are to be made "in the sound discretion of
the court" based upon "(1) the value of the expert
assistance to the defendant's proper representation * *
* and (2) the availability [694 N .E.2d 944) of
alternative devices that would fulfill the same
functions." State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d
164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N .E.2d 264, paragraph four of
the syllabus. See, also, Sup.R. 20(IV)(D).
Accordingly, we hold that due process, as
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and Section 16,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, requires that an
indigent criminal defendant be provided funds to
obtain expert assistance at state expense only where
the trial court finds, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, that the defendant has made a
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particularized showing (1) of a reasonable probability
that the requested expert would aid in his defense, and
(2) that denial of the requested expert assistance
would result in an unfair trial.
In applying these principles to the case before us,
we conclude that Mason has not demonstrated that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying him some
funds for experts while allowing other funds.
[2] Soils Expert. Mason did not demonstrate a
particularized need for a soils expert. At trial, Mason
repeatedly made his primary point, namely, that the
state produced no evidence of dirt or debris on his
clothing showing that he had been walking through
farm fields four days before. Mason did not need a
soils expert to make that point.

-

Even had a soils expert testified that dirt on Mason's
shoes was not consistent with dirt found at the crime
scene, the probative value of that evidence would have
been minimal at best, in that the shoes were not taken
by the police for *151 several days after Robin's
disappearance. Hence, Mason did not show that the
fairness of his trial was dependent upon being
provided a soils expert. State v. Broom (1988), 40
Ohio St.3d 277, 283, 533 N .E.2d 682, 691.
[3] Shoeprint Expert. Mason claims that the trial
court erred in not granting his untimely request, made
on the sixth day of trial, for a shoeprint expert. A
police technician found impressions of a chevron
design, possibly a shoeprint, on the Buick's dashboard
and passenger door, which suggested a struggle. Both
the victim and Mason wore tennis shoes with chevron
soles, although the impressions were too faint to trace
to any particular shoe.
Both the state and the defense acknowledged,
however, that Mason and Robin had both been in the
car on February 8. The state argued that the
shoeprints were relevant because they tended to
support the state's contention that a struggle had taken
place in the car. Mason did not make a particularized
showing that a shoeprint expert might have rebutted
that inference or that a privately retained shoe expert
would have been able to identify the shoeprints more
specifically than could the state's experts.

-

[4] In the court of appeals, Mason complained only
of the trial court's failure to provide him with a soils
expert and a shoeprint expert. This court "will not
ordinarily consider a claim of error that was not
raised in any way in the Court of Appeals and was not
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considered or decided by that court."
State v.
Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 0.0.3d 98,
364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus.
However, upon review in this capital case, we
conclude that Mason's remaining claims as to funds
for experts not pursued before the court of appeals
also lack merit whether viewed on a plain-error basis
or as a claimed abuse of discretion.
[5] Eyewitness Identification Expert. A trial court
can legitimately refuse funds for an expert absent "a
showing of demonstrable prejudice." State v. Broom,
40 Ohio St.3d at 284, 533 N.E.2d at 691. Mason
made no such showing. The state did not rely solely
on eyewitness identifications to link Mason to the
murder of Robin Dennis. Rather the state presented
other substantial evidence connecting Mason to those
crimes.
Defense counsel was able to fully and adequately
cross-examine each of the eyewitnesses (Deputy
Lautenslager, Francis Forster, and Thomas Forster),
and thereby cast doubt on the accuracy of their
recollections.
Moreover, Mason did procure an
expert on eyewitness identification without state
funds. Because the jury heard his testimony and
nevertheless convicted Mason, the trial [694 N .E.2d
945] court's refusal to provide funds for such an
expert was harmless.
The trial court acted within its discretion in denying
funds for an expert on eyewitness identification to
assist the defense in challenging the validity of the
*152 eyewitnesses' identification of Mason as the
black male in the area of Robin's car on February 8.
[6] Homicide Investigation Expert. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
additional funds for the defense to obtain a second
investigator for the purpose of critiquing the police
investigation. Such funds were not necessary to
ensure the fairness of Mason's trial, nor did Mason's
request point to more than a mere possibility that such
an expert might have been relevant to the defense.
The trial court did allow funds for an expert
investigator, and his investigation helped to produce
over thirty defense witnesses in the trial phase.
[7] Mass Media Expert. The services of a mass
media expert were not reasonably necessary for
proper representation or to guarantee the fairness of
Mason's trial. See State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at
193, 15 OBR at 336, 473 N.E.2d at 292 (sociologist
to assist voir dire unnecessary); State v. Landrum
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(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 117, 559 N.E.2d 710, 723
(psychologist for jury selection unnecessary).

again failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or
outcome-determinative plain error.

[8] Firearms Expert.
Mason did not make a
particularized showing of need for a firearms expert.
A state expert witness did testify that a piece of metal
found at the crime scene matched the characteristics
of the grip-frame from a Colt revolver. Chris Dennis
had such a gun, and the evidence indicates he had
agreed to trade it to Mason for a television.

In sum, we reject Mason's contention that the trial
court's refusal to provide him with all the experts he
requested denied him his constitutional or statutory
rights.
II

Suppression of Pretrial Statements
But testimony from a traditional firearms expert
would not have helped Mason.
The compelling
evidence on this point was simply the observable
similarity between the crime-scene piece of metal and
a grip frame from a Colt revolver, as well as a
comparison photograph of the two items. Moreover,
that evidence could equally incriminate Chris Dennis,
and thus support the defense claim that Chris
murdered his wife.
Again, Mason failed to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
[9] DNA Statistical Expert.
Mason failed to
demonstrate a need for a DNA statistical expert.
Ultimately, Mason did not dispute the DNA test
results. Provision of a DNA statistical expert would
have been superfluous, and the absence of one did not
render the trial unfair.
[10} Forensic Psychologist. Mason also failed to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the denial of
funds for a defense forensic psychologist. Cf. State v.
Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 256-258, 552
N.E.2d 191, 194-195; State v. Esparza (1988), 39
Ohio St.3d 8, 529 N.E.2d 192.
Mason's mental
status was not a central feature of the trial, as in Ake
v. Oklahoma.
Mason did secure the services of a
psychiatrist, at state expense, although he decided, for
tactical reasons, not to present that testimony.

'-

[11] Social Worker/Mitigation Expert. Nor was
Mason entitled to the assistance of a social worker or
mitigation expert in the penalty phase as he claims.
See State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413,
427-428, 653 N.E.2d 253, 267. The defense *153
team of two lawyers and an investigator looked fully
into Mason's background. Moreover, the state had
collected and released to the defense in January 1994
voluminous records concerning Mason, including
records about his last nine years in and out of prison
as well as school records and juvenile incarcerations.
In fact, Mason deliberately chose not to present
background mitigation evidence to avoid unfavorable
rebuttal evidence from the state. Thus, Mason has

Mason claims that the trial court erred in refusing to
suppress statements he made during police interviews
on February 10 and 12 because police did not advise
him of his [694 N.E.2d 946] Miranda rights, and
because his statements were involuntary. Although
Mason made no directly incriminating statements, his
pretrial account of his February 8 activities was used
to demonstrate a conflict with his trial testimony as to
events relevant to Robin's death.
[12] On February 10, Detective Dennis Potts
stopped by Mason's house, drove him to the police
station, asked him questions for eighteen minutes,
then drove him home after driving by the Youngs'
residence. On February 12, Potts again stopped at
Mason's house and asked whether he would go to the
police station for further interviews. Mason again
voluntarily agreed. The ensuing conversations, all
recorded, began at 11 :29 a.m. and lasted until 3 :24
p.m.
Mason was cooperative and talked freely
throughout.
Around 4:00 p.m., police advised Mason of his
Miranda rights, and his parole officer (who had
secretly observed the interview) arrested him for
violating the conditions of his parole by drinking and
associating with felons. After Mason asked for an
attorney, police stopped further questioning.
Until he was told that he was under arrest,
detectives never told Mason that he could not leave,
and he was never handcuffed. Mason acknowledged
that he was left alone two or three times, the door was
not locked, and that the first time he understood that
he would be arrested and could not leave was around
4:00 p.m.
[13] Only a custodial interrogation triggers the need
for a Miranda rights warning. Berkemer v. McCarty
(1984), 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d
317. The evidence supports the trial court's finding
that Mason was not in custody when questioned.
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*154
The fact that a suspect is being
interviewed at a police station does not, per se,
require a Miranda rights warning.
Rather, the
determination as to whether a custodial interrogation
has occurred requires an inquiry into "how a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have
understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336.
"[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement'
of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 1125,
103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279,
quoting Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492,
495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719.
Since Mason was not in custody, police did not
violate his Miranda rights. See Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714;
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1123, 103 S.Ct. at
3519, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1278; State v. Biros (1997), 78
Ohio St.3d 426, 440, 678 N .E.2d 891, 904.
[15] [16] Moreover, evidence supports the trial
court's finding that Mason's statements were
voluntary. A court, in determining whether a pretrial
statement is involuntary, "should consider the totality
of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and
prior criminal experience of the accused; the length,
intensity, and frequency of interrogation;
the
existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment;
and the existence of threat or inducement." State v.
Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 0.0.3d 18, 358
N .E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the syllabus.
In this case, Mason was a thirty-year-old high
school graduate who had taken some college courses.
He had two prior felony convictions and was
experienced with criminal investigations. He was not
threatened, mistreated, coerced, or wrongfully
induced to make statements. Moreover, questioning
on February 10 lasted only eighteen minutes, and the
February 12 questioning, although spread over four
hours, included substantial periods of inactivity.
Under the totality of circumstances, his pretrial
statements in which he continued to maintain his
innocence were voluntary. Compare State v. Loza
(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 66, 641 N.E.2d 1082,
1094.

-

The trial court did not err in finding that, during the
initial two interviews on February 10 and February
12, 1993, the defendant was not in custody and
therefore the officers were not required to provide
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him with Miranda warnings. Nor did the trial court
err in finding the statements to have been voluntarily
made.
[694 N.E.2d 947]

III
Denial of Continuance
[ 17] Mason argues that the trial court erred in failing
to grant his counsel's requests for reasonable
continuances in order to investigate and prepare for
trial. His claim lacks merit.
[18] *155 "The grant or denial of a continuance is
a matter that is entrusted to the broad, sound
discretion of the trial judge." State v. Unger (1981),
67 Ohio St.2d 65, 21 0.0.3d 41, 423 N.E.2d 1078,
syllabus. In both State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio
St.3d 1, 17, 570 N.E.2d 229, 249, and State v.
Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 115, 559 N.E.2d at 721,
this court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a continuance despite counsel's
claims that they needed more time to prepare. In
State v. Johnson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 87, 94-95, 24
OBR 282, 288-289, 494 N.E.2d 1061, 1067-1068, the
trial court was found to have abused its discretion in
denying a continuance, but Johnson involved newly
discovered evidence, a situation not present here.
On January 19, 1994, the prosecutor released
approximately three thousand pages of Mason's
institutional records to defense counsel, which the
prosecutor claims were not subject to discovery. The
trial judge stated that after release of the records, both
the prosecutor and the defendant agreed to May 31,
1994 as a firm trial date.
On May 23, 1994, Mason moved for a continuance
on the basis that the state had disclosed two days
earlier an additional four hundred eleven pages of
relevant police investigative reports and witness
statements. Mason's counsel argued that more time
was needed to study, analyze, and follow up on this
mass of information. The court denied the motion on
May 27.
At the start of voir dire, on May 31, Mason's lead
counsel renewed his arguments for a continuance,
declaring that he was unprepared to go forward and
would not do so. After hearing his explanations, the
trial court expressed skepticism as to the legitimacy of
the need for continuance. When the court threatened
to remove counsel without pay, counsel agreed to
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proceed to trial.

merit.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Mason's counsel had been allowed
adequate time to review the witness's statements,
police investigative files, and other materials that were
furnished to him. His two appointed counsel first
appeared at pretrial hearings in October 1993, eight
months before trial began on May 31, 1994.

[20] Mason first argues that the trial court unfairly
restricted voir dire as to prospective jurors' views
about race. As Mason points out, Turner v. Murray
(1986), 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1688, 90
L.Ed.2d 27, 37, held that a "capital defendant accused
of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective
jurors * * *questioned on the issue of racial bias."

In addition to two counsel, the trial court also
granted the defense funds for a trained investigator, a
psychiatrist, pathologist, and for blood and DNA
testing. Counsel received additional assistance from
the State Public Defender's Office. Prior to trial,
Mason filed more than fifty pretrial motions and
conducted several pretrial hearings. At trial, he called
thirty-one witnesses. Contrary to Mason's claim,
counsel had more than enough time to prepare, and
the record demonstrates extensive preparation.

[21] Nonetheless, the Turner court also recognized
that "the trial judge retains discretion as to the form
and number of questions on the subject, including the
decision whether to question the venire individually or
collectively. See Ham v. South Carolina [1973], 409
U.S.
[524] at 527 [93 S.Ct. 848, 850-851, 35
L.Ed.2d 46, 50]." Turner, 476 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct.
at 1689, 90 L.Ed.2d at 37. In Ohio, too, the scope of
voir dire is within a trial court's discretion and varies
with the circumstances. See State v. Bedford (1988),
39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 529 N.E.2d 913, 920;
Crim.R. 24(A); R.C. 2945.27.

In sum, Mason has not demonstrated that the court
abused its discretion in denying defense motions for
continuance made only eight days before the *156
scheduled trial date and on the morning of trial. Nor
has Mason demonstrated that his counsel needed more
time to effectively represent him.
IV

In this case, the trial court allowed Mason an
opportunity to discern racial bias as required by
Turner v. Murray, supra.
Before trial, each juror
was asked to complete a forty-one-question form,
specifically designed for this case, which asked
questions as to their background, experiences, and
attitudes.

Jury Selection Issues
[19] Mason contends that the trial court and defense
counsel erred in voir dire by referring to the jury's
sentences verdict as a recommendation. Although the
term "recommendation" was used briefly in voir dire
and in final instructions, the judge and counsel
generally avoided the term.
Further, we have
previously
held
that
use
of
the
term
"recommendation" does not constitute error. See,
e.g., State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 326,
686 N.E.2d 245, 260-261; State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio
St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N .E.2d 264, paragraph
six of the syllabus. In this case, error did occur in
using the term "recommendation" in reference to a
possible verdict of a life sentence, as a jury
recommendation of a life sentence is binding on the
trial court. But the error is harmless.

-

[694 N .E.2d 948] Mason further argues that during
the jury selection process, the trial judge unduly
restricted voir dire, the prosecutor engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct, and Mason's counsel failed
to provide effective assistance. These claims lack

[22] Moreover, during individual voir dire, the trial
court allowed prospective jurors to be asked about
racial prejudice or bias. Admittedly, the trial court
wanted to defer extensive questioning about racial bias
to general voir dire. But the trial *157 court has
discretion over whether to cover this subject in
individual or general voir dire. Turner, 476 U.S. at
37, 106 S.Ct. at 1689, 90 L.Ed.2d at 37; State v.
Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 523,
paragraph two of the syllabus.
In fact, Mason's counsel asked jurors about their
racial attitudes both during individual and general voir
dire, which extended into three days. Thus, Mason
was not denied an opportunity to question jurors on
racial attitudes. See, also, State v. Durr (1991), 58
Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 568 N.E.2d 674, 678-679.
[23] Mason complains because, during individual
voir dire of juror Crane, the trial judge said, "I agree
with you there" after Crane remarked that "people are
sentenced to death, and then they don't do anything
about it anyhow, so it's not really a deterrent."
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Previously, the court, in referring to the crimes of
child murder and rape, stated, "There are certain
cases that---where the death penalty is proper and, of
course, that would be one of them. And you're
saying that you would apply that as one of them?"
Mason contends that these remarks constituted
inappropriate comment by the court as to its view of
the death penalty.
[24] Although improper, the court's isolated remarks
to single jurors was largely innocuous, and evoked no
defense objection. The trial court instructed the jury
to disregard any "indication of my view on the facts"
and to disregard, in determining the penalty, any
"indication of its view of the case."
Unless it is
proven otherwise, the jury is presumed to follow such
instructions. See State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio
St.3d 24, 33, 528 N.E.2d 1237, 1246.

-

[25) [26) Mason also claims that the prosecutor's
reference to the "guilt phase" of the trial in individual
voir dire of six prospective jurors created a
"presumption of guilt." However, three of them did
not sit as jurors. Moreover, the prosecutor explained
to all that the first phase dealt with determining guilt
or innocence. The first phase of a bifurcated capital
case may be referred to as the "guilt phase" as a
convenient abbreviation, rather than using awkward
terms such as the "guilt or innocence phase" or
"determination of guilt or innocence" phase.
[27) Mason also claims his counsel was ineffective
during jury selection. Yet reversal of a conviction or
sentence based on ineffective assistance requires
finding both (a) deficient performance, "errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' [694 N. E. 2d 949] guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment," and (b) prejudice, "errors
* * * so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v.
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693. Accord State v.
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373.

-

[28) [29) Mason's complaints mostly amount to
hindsight views about how current counsel might have
voir dired the jury differently. However, we will not
second-guess trial strategy decisions, and "a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional *158 assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. See,
also, State v. Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326,
349-350, 581N.E.2d1362, 1381.
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As to all of Mason's claims of ineffective assistance
in regard to counsel's performance at voir dire,
Mason fails to establish prejudice, namely, "that there
exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for
counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have
been different." State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136,
538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.
[30] [31] [32) Mason argues that the prosecution
improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude
prospective jurors based on their opposition to the
death penalty. But Mason waived the claim when he
failed to ask for the state's explanation. See State v.
Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 485, 653
N .E.2d 304, 317. Moreover, apart from excluding
jurors based on race or sex, "prosecutors can exercise
a peremptory challenge for any reason, without
inquiry, and without a court's control." State v.
Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 13, 564 N.E.2d 408,
419; J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994), 511 U.S.
127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89. Batson v.
Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90
L.Ed.2d 69, does not extend to peremptory strikes
against jurors opposed to the death penalty. State v.
Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 249, 586 N.E.2d
1042, 1057; State v. Esparza, 39 Ohio St.3d at
13-14, 529 N.E.2d at 198.
Thus, Mason's contention that his conviction should
be reversed based on error in voir dire is rejected.

v
Guilt-Phase Issues
[33) [34) [35) [36] Gruesome Photos. Mason argues
that the state's use of "cumulative, gruesome, [and]
inflammatory color photographs" denied him a fair
trial and due process.
Under Evid.R. 403, the
admission of photographs is left to a trial court's
sound discretion. State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio
St.3d 239, 264, 15 OBR 379, 401, 473 N.E.2d 768,
791.
Relevant, nonrepetitive photographs are
admissible in capital cases, even if gruesome, as long
as the probative value of each photograph outweighs
the danger of material prejudice. Id. at paragraph
seven of the syllabus.
[37] Mason has failed to show that the trial court
abused its discretion or that prejudicial impact of any
of six crime-scene photos of the victim or three
autopsy photos outweighed its individual probative
value. These photographs were limited in number,
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and small (3-1/4 by 5 inches).
They are not
particularly gruesome or inflammatory. Two of the
crime-scene photos were cumulative, but we find the
error in admitting both to be harmless.
*159 The probative value of each photo is apparent.
The prosecution's theory of the circumstances
surrounding Robin's death was that a struggle of some
type had taken place in the victim's car, after which
the victim escaped and was chased into the abandoned
building, where she was ultimately raped and
murdered.
The crime-scene photos of Robin's
battered, bruised, and disrobed body, with her jeans
and panties pulled below her knees, tend both to prove
that her death was committed in conjunction with a
sexual offense and to rebut any inference that Robin
engaged in consensual sexual activity. Other photos
portray Robin's injuries and are relevant to proof of
intent to kill. Finally, the photos are admissible, since
they illustrate the testimony of the coroner and police.
Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR [694 N.E.2d 950
] 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the
syllabus.

-

The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in
admitting the photographs as evidence.
[38] Improper Transcripts. Mason argues that the
state's use of "transcripts with clear racially
derogatory overtones" of his February 1993 police
interviews in addition to the tapes denied him a fair
trial. Mason contends that by accurately portraying
Mason's use of ethnic language, the transcripts
created "racially derogatory overtones" and were
"inherently prejudicial."
[39] Yet Mason failed to object to use of the
transcripts on this basis, although he had the
transcripts and knew of their intended use. Had the
issue been timely raised, revisions to the transcript
might have been made. Mason waived this issue.
Evid.R. 103(A)(l).

-

Nor does plain error exist. Detective Potts testified
that the transcripts were accurate, and counsel did not
suggest otherwise. The jury knew about Mason's
occasional use of ethnic English, since they had heard
the tapes. "Where there are no 'material differences'
between a tape admitted into evidence and a transcript
given to the jury as a listening aid, there is no
prejudicial error." State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio
St.3d 424, 445, 588 N.E.2d 819, 835.
[40] Further, the trial court did not abuse its
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discretion by allowing the transcripts in the jury
room.
The transcripts are useful and easier to
understand than the tapes.
See United States v.
Rengifo (C.A.1, 1986), 789 F.2d 975.
The court
carefully instructed the jurors, "The transcripts are
merely an aid to facilitate listening," and if they found
any difference between the tape and transcript, "[Y]ou
should disregard the transcript and use your own
judgment as to what was said * * *."
Under the
circumstances, no prejudicial error occurred. See
United States v. Costa (C.A.11, 1982), 691 F.2d
1358, 1362; United States v. Carson (C.A.2, 1972),
464 F.2d 424, 436-437.
[41] Exclusion of Evidence of Other Acts of
Victim's Husband.
Mason contends that he was
prevented from fully defending himself because the
trial court refused to allow evidence of prior specific
violent acts of Chris Dennis, Robin's *160 husband.
Mason contends that this exclusion hindered him in
supporting his claim that Robin's murder had been
committed by her husband. Mason argues that the
trial court wrongfully excluded evidence that Chris
Dennis (a) beat up a Chris Lyons and left him
unconscious in a remote area in 1989, (b) attacked
Ben Audin with a machete, and (c) struck his prior
wife in the face.
[42] Yet evidence that Chris Dennis had allegedly
committed specific acts of violence was not
admissible. Subject to certain exceptions, Evid.R.
404(A) provides, "Evidence of a person's character or
a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion * * *."
None of the exceptions listed in Evid.R. 404(A) is
applicable.
[43] Mason argues that the exceptions to Evid.R.
404(A) should be expanded because Chris Dennis was
not on trial. According to Mason, Evid.R. 404 should
not apply to witnesses or alternate suspects. But
Evid.R. 404, by its terms, applies to all character
evidence, not simply to persons accused of crimes.
Mason was allowed to present some evidence that
tended to show the criminal propensity of Chris
Dennis. One witness testified that Chris had knocked
Robin's head against the dashboard of her car at a
New Year's Eve party, and a second testified that she
had seen Chris bloody Robin's face before she got
into the car at this party. The court allowed this
defense evidence to explain blood later found in the
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car. The first also commented on Chris's tendency
for violence. The defense also questioned Chris about
his heavy drinking and his fights with Robin.
The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
allow evidence as to other specific acts of Chris
Dennis, nor were Mason's constitutional rights
violated thereby.
See, generally, Annotation,
Admissibility of Evidence of Commission of Similar
Crime by One Other[694 N.E.2d 951] Than Accused
(1994), 22 A.LR.5th 1; Winfield v. United States
(D.C.App.1996), 676 A.2d 1;
United States v.
McCourt (C.A.9, 1991), 925 F.2d 1229, 1236, fn. 12.
[44] [45] Guilt phase instructions. Mason argues
that the trial court erred by "instructing the jury that it
must first determine that Mason was not guilty * * *
of aggravated murder" before considering whether he
was guilty of murder. Yet Mason failed to object at
trial and thus waived all but plain error. Crim.R.
30(A); State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12,
3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.

-

The trial court instructed the jury: "If you find the
Defendant not guilty of Aggravated Murder, you will
then continue with your deliberations and determine
whether or not the State of Ohio proved beyond a
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the
lesser crime of murder."
*161 We have held that instructions similar to those
given here are not "acquittal first" instructions and did
not constitute plain error. State v. Allen (1995), 73
Ohio St.3d 626, 638, 653 N.E.2d 675, 687; cf. State
v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d
286, paragraph three of the syllabus. Moreover,
since the jury found Mason guilty of raping Robin
Dennis, it could not reasonably have found him not
guilty of felony murder but guilty only of murder.
The jury would have convicted Mason of aggravated
murder rather than the lesser included offense of
murder even if given the lesser included offense
option. Cf. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d at 637-638, 653
N.E.2d at 686-687. Hence, assuming arguendo that
error was committed, that error was necessarily
harmless.

Thus, Mason's contention that his conviction should
be reversed based on guilt-phase evidentiary rulings
and instructions is rejected.

--

VI
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Mason claims pervasive prosecutorial misconduct
during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial,
focusing on the state's cross-examination of him and
final guilt-phase and penalty-phase arguments.
[46] Determination of whether improper remarks
constitute prejudicial prosecutorial
misconduct
requires analysis as to (1) whether the remarks were
improper and, (2) if so, whether the remarks
prejudicially affected the accused's substantial rights.
State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR
317, 318, 470 N.E.2d 883, 885.
[47] During cross-examination of Mason, the state
highlighted differences between his pretrial statements
and his testimony.
For example, in his pretrial
statements, Mason claimed that he scarcely knew
Robin and had never been alone with her. At trial,
Mason asserted that she voluntarily had sex with him
the morning of her death, thereby directly
On crosscontradicting his pretrial statements.
examination, over objection, the prosecutor asked
Mason whether, consistent with his pretrial claims, he
had his "attorneys do independent DNA testing to see
if our [the state's] DNA results were right?"
Under the circumstances, the state could remark on
the differences between Mason's pretrial statement
and his trial testimony and on the defense's decision
to "switch strategies," and contrast his earlier denials
and challenge to DNA testing with Mason's trial
testimony that he had sex with Robin that day. By
commenting on Mason's earlier lies to police, the
prosecutor was not penalizing Mason for exercising
his rights. See State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at
110, 559 N.E.2d at 716-717.
[48] [49] *162 Admittedly, the state's remark in
the final guilt-phase argument that Mason's counsel
"tried to cloud the issues, tried to confuse" may have
denigrated defense counsel. See State v. Keenan
(1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 406, 613 N.E.2d 203,
207.
Yet counsel failed to object to any of the
prosecutor's final guilt-phase argument. Thus, he
waived all but plain error. State v. Wade (1978), 53
Ohio St.2d 182, 7 0.0.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244,
paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B). No
plain error exists.
Here, as in Landrum, when
"viewed in its total context, the prosecutor's final
argument was reasoned, logical, and not emotional."
State [694 N.E.2d 952] v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at
111, 559 N.E.2d at 717.

Prosecutorial Misconduct
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[50] [51] [52] Additionally, the state could point out
the weakness in defense claims that Mason and Robin
were romantically involved. The state could also
remark on the inconsistency between Mason's attack
on eyewitness testimony and his own reliance upon
doubtful eyewitness testimony.
"Prosecutors are
entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has shown
and what inferences can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence." State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89,
111, 684 N.E.2d 668, 689.
[53] [54] The state did characterize Mason's
testimony that police planted his keys in the victim's
car as preposterous, but scene photos and the ensuing
disassembly of the car proved that police never
planted this evidence. "A prosecutor may state his
opinion if it is based on the evidence presented at
trial." State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 10,
572 N.E.2d 97, 106.

-

[55] [56] The prosecutor did assert that the police
"did an outstanding job" in their investigation, and
thereby improperly vouched for the police. However,
we do not find that prejudicial error resulted from the
prosecutor's remarks, particularly in light of defense
counsel's repeated cnt1c1sm of the police
investigation. Where a prosecutorial statement not
supported by admitted evidence is "short, oblique, and
justified as a reply to defense arguments and elicits no
contemporaneous objection, there is no prejudicial
error." State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 166,
555 N.E.2d 293, 300.
In view of the weight of evidence of Mason's guilt,
none of the remarks Mason now complains about
constituted plain error. Nor as to issues preserved,
such as the cross-examination about DNA, were his
rights materially prejudiced.
[57] Mason argues misconduct during the
prosecution's closing penalty phase argument, but
again his failure to object to remarks now complained
about waives all but plain error. State v. Wade, 53
Ohio St.2d 182, 7 0.0.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244,
paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B).

--

[58] No plain error or impropriety exists. The
prosecutor's sentencing argument was restrained,
noninflammatory, and based upon evidence before the
court. Contrary to Mason's claims, the prosecutor
correctly identified the aggravating circumstance and
never attempted to make the murder an aggravating
circumstance.
*163
"Moreover, the prosecutor
could legitimately refer to the nature and
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circumstances of the offense, both to refute any
suggestion that they were mitigating and to explain
why the specified aggravatingcircumstance * * *
outweighed mitigating factors."
State v. Combs
(1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 283, 581 N.E.2d 1071,
1077.
[59] [60] [61] The prosecutor could properly
minimize the importance of Mason's good conduct in
jail, his artistic ability, and family opinions that
Mason should avoid the death penalty, and comment
upon the paucity of relevant mitigating evidence.
"Prosecutors can urge the merits of their cause and
legitimately argue that defense mitigation evidence is
worthy of little or no weight." State v. Wilson (1996),
74 Ohio St.3d 381, 399, 659 N.E.2d 292, 309.
[62] [63] [64] Since Mason relied upon residual
doubt, the prosecutor could comment that defense
explanations seemed "far fetched." A prosecutor can
respond to issues raised by an accused. State v.
Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d at 491, 653 N.E.2d at 322.
The prosecutor did not exceed limits by noting that
Mason made an unsworn statement on which he could
not be cross-examined. State v. Gumm (1995), 73
Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, syllabus ("counsel
for the state may comment upon the defendant's
unsworn statement, if any").

VII
Sufficiency of Evidence
Mason attacks the sufficiency of evidence to support
his conviction for rape, aggravated murder during a
rape, and the death-penalty specification that the
murder occurred in the course of rape.
[65] [66] In a review for sufficiency following a
conviction, the evidence must be considered[694
N .E.2d 953]
in a light most favorable to the
prosecution. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d
259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus.
"[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier
of the facts." State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39
0.0.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the
syllabus.
[67] The evidence was such that the jury could
reasonably find Mason guilty of rape, aggravated
felony-murder based upon rape, and the death-penalty
specification alleging rape. First, sexual penetration
was clearly evidenced by the presence of Mason's
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semen in Robin's body.
Thus, cases finding
insufficient evidence of rape or attempted rape due to
the lack of evidence of actual or attempted sexual
penetration are inapposite. See, e.g., State v. Davis
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 114, 666 N.E.2d 1099,
1107.
[68] Second, the element of force was supported by
evidence of a struggle in Robin's car, and the fact that
her jeans and panties were found pulled down *164
below her knees. In addition, the evidence indicated
use of force in that Robin had been both strangled and
beaten. In other cases, similar evidence was sufficient
to prove the element of force. See State v. McGuire
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 396, 686 N .E.2d 1112,
1118; State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569,
576, 660 N.E.2d 724, 732; State v. Scudder (1994),
71 Ohio St.3d 263, 274, 643 N.E.2d 524, 533.

-

[69] The jury had the right to believe the testimony
of the state's witnesses and disbelieve Mason as to his
activities on the date of Robin's disappearance. The
record includes evidence that Robin and Mason left a
private residence together in Robin's car in the early
afternoon of February 8, 1993, that Robin's
abandoned car was observed at approximately 4:30
that afternoon within walking distance of where her
body was found, that a man matching Mason's
description was seen in the same general area later
that afternoon by two separate witnesses, and that
Robin's husband Chris, who Mason contended was
the murderer, was passed out drunk from early on the
afternoon of February 8 until well after dark on that
day. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's
conclusion that it was Mason who battered and killed
Robin Dennis.
Mason's argument that his conviction should be
reversed based on insufficiency of the evidence is
rejected.

VIII
Penalty-Phase Instructions
Mason argues that the trial court repeatedly erred in
instructing the jury.

-

[70] Voir Dire Instructions. Mason notes that in
preliminary voir dire instructions, the trial judge
stated that if Mason were found guilty, a second
hearing would occur to consider sentence, but failed
to tell the jury how it would determine whether to
recommend death and implied that a finding of guilty
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on any charge could warrant the death penalty.
[71] Because Mason failed to contemporaneously
object, error, if any, is waived, unless rising to the
level of plain error. State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio
St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N .E.2d 1332, syllabus.
Despite Mason's complaint, the trial judge need not at
that early stage completely instruct the jury, for
example, by defining "aggravating circumstances" and
"mitigating factors."
The context of an instruction
must be considered. State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio
St.2d 136, 14 0.0.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 772,
paragraph four of syllabus. We find no plain error.
[72] Failure to Define Mitigating Factors. The court
instructed the jury to consider "mitigating factors
including, but not limited to, the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history,
character, and background of the Defendant, and any
other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether
the *165 Defendant should be sentenced to death."
Although the trial judge did not specifically define the
term "mitigating factors," the instructions, considered
as a whole, adequately guided the jury and did not
restrict its consideration of mitigating evidence. See
State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 397, 659 N.E.2d at
308; State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 554,
577, 605 N.E.2d [694 N.E.2d 954] 884, 903; State v.
Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 122, 559 N.E.2d at
727-728.
[73] Guilt-phase Evidence. The trial judge did not
err in instructing the jury to consider testimony and
exhibits "relevant to the aggravating circumstances
and the mitigating factors which are admitted into
evidence in the first phase of this case" in their
penalty deliberations. The prosecutor at the penalty
phase may introduce any evidence from the guilt
phase relevant to the aggravating circumstances.
State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 528
N.E.2d 542, paragraph one of the syllabus. In State
v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 78, 623
N.E.2d 75, 81, the court recognized that all exhibits
from a trial's guilt phase "were relevant to the death
penalty specifications * * * and to the nature and
Further, by relying
circumstances of the offense."
upon residual doubt in arguing against the death
penalty, Mason invited reconsideration of all guilt
phase evidence.
[74] Appeal. The trial court instructed the jury,
over objection, that Mason's "right to appeal his
conviction will not be limited in any way by your
imposition of the death sentence. Secondly, you
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should not consider the subject of appeal in
Mason provoked this
determining sentence."
instruction when he declared, in his unsworn
statement, "[A]ll I'm asking for is you guys to not
sentence me to death and give me one of the life
sentences, so I will have a chance to bring this to
Appeal Courts * * *. [G]ive me the chance to take it
through the Appeals Courts * * *."
The court's
instruction was appropriate, accurately reflected the
law, and did not diminish the jury's sense of its
importance. Compare State v. Phillips (1995), 74
Ohio St.3d 72, 101, 656 N.E.2d 643, 669; State v.
Rogers (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 427, 28 OBR 480, 504
N.E.2d 52, paragraph one of the syllabus, reversed
other grounds (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 70, 512 N.E.2d
581.
(75] Aggravating Circumstances. The trial court did
err in referring to "aggravating circumstances," when
only a single aggravating circumstance existed.
Nonetheless, this slip of the tongue did not constitute
plain error, particularly as the trial court identified for
the jury a single aggravating circumstance of felonymurder.

-

(76] (77] Mercy/Residual Doubt. Despite Mason's
claims, the trial court need not instruct on mercy.
State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 638, 653
N.E.2d 675, 687; State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio
St.3d 414, 417, 613 N.E.2d 212, 216. Nor need the
court instruct on residual doubt. State v. McGuire, 80
Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N .E.2d 1112, syllabus.

*166 Mason's contention that his conviction should
be reversed based on error in instructions to the jury
is rejected.

IX
Juror Bias/Deadlock/Misconduct
(78] Juror Bias. Mason argues that he was denied a
fair trial by an all-white jury because of racial
prejudice.
In a hearing on a new trial motion, an alternate juror
testified that during the trial after two or three days,
some jurors made remarks she considered racist. An
impaneled juror testified to hearing "racist remarks
[said in] a jive manner," but stated that it had no
impact on her or other jurors.

-

The overall record suggests that any such comments
were isolated and did not demonstrate that the jury

Page 29

was racially prejudiced or that Mason was denied a
fair trial.
Eleven jurors in affidavits all denied
After
participating in or observing any racism.
considering the evidence, the trial judge concluded
that "[a]t no time during the trial did any of the jurors
participate in any acts of racism which could have
impaired the Defendant's ability to receive a fair
trial."
No reason exists to disturb the trial court's
finding.
[79] Jury Deadlock. Mason argues that if the jury
reports a sentencing-phase deadlock, the court must
then instruct the jury to consider only life sentences
and
cannot
allow
continued
death-penalty
deliberations.
After approximately four and one-half hours of
deliberations at the penalty phase, the jury sent out a
note stating, "We are unable to reach a unanimous
decision on any one of the sentencing options. Please
advise (694 N .E.2d 955] * * *." Over defense
objection, the trial judge then instructed the jury to
continue deliberations but also instructed them, "If
you decide that you cannot agree and that further
deliberations will not serve a useful purpose, you may
ask to be returned to the courtroom * * *." See State
v. Howard (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 18, 537 N.E.2d
188.
The trial court then asked the foreman whether there
was "a possibility * * * that after an additional period
of time you may reach an agreement * * * [after]
considering * * * the instructions?"
The foreman
answered "No," but he agreed to discuss with other
jurors and "then return and respond to that question."
At 5:00 p.m., the jury sent a note that they had made
"some progress" and that it was "best to adjourn for
the evening & resume fresh in the AM. " After
returning the next morning, the jury indicated after
thirty minutes or so that they had reached a verdict.
[80] In State v. Springer (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 167,
170, 586 N.E.2d 96, 99, the court recognized that
Ohio's death-penalty statutes do "not contemplate the
possibility *167 of a hung jury in the penalty phase
of a capital murder trial."
Hence, "[w]hen a jury
becomes irreconcilably deadlocked during its
sentencing deliberations * * * the trial court is
required" to impose an appropriate life sentence. Id.
at syllabus. In view of Springer, Mason argues that
the court erred by using a modified Howard charge,
and contends that the court "should have told them to
consider the two life options or should have sentenced
Mason itself."
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[81] No exact line can be drawn as to how long a
jury must deliberate in the penalty phase before a trial
court should instruct the jury to limit itself to the life
sentence options or take the case away from the jury,
as done in Springer.
Each case must be decided
based upon the particular circumstances. Here, after
only four and one-half hours of deliberations, the trial
court acted appropriately by giving a modified
Howard charge. The circumstances show that the
jury was not irreconcilably deadlocked, and the
modified Howard charge did not coerce a death
verdict.
[82] Further, this court has approved using
supplemental instructions urging jurors to continue
deliberations to try to reach a unanimous penalty
verdict. See, e.g., State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio
St.3d 24, 26, 553 N.E.2d 576, 582-583.
Such
supplemental instructions to a jury considering the
death penalty do not violate due process. Lowenjield
v. Phelps (1988), 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98
L.Ed.2d 568.

-

[83] Jury Misconduct.
Mason argues jury
misconduct and contends that the trial court's reliance
on the aliunde rule, Evid.R. 606(B) (limiting evidence
about jury's deliberation), denied him a fair trial. The
aliunde principle protects the privacy of a jury's
deliberations from inquiry and promotes the finality of
jury verdicts. See State v. Adams (1943), 141 Ohio
St. 423, 25 0.0. 570, 48 N.E.2d 861.
After receiving evidence at a hearing held on a
motion for new trial filed by Mason, the trial court
found insufficient evidence that any juror "had failed
to keep an open mind so as to be able to fairly decide
* * * this case." The trial court further found that all
jurors "were awake and attentive during all
proceedings of the trial," and that the actions of one
juror in "reporting * * * that she had disassembled
her husband's revolver did not influence the verdict *
* * [and Mason] was not prejudiced by this conduct."
As to all of Mason's claims of misconduct, he has
failed to establish any prejudice arising from the
asserted misconduct. See Crim.R. 33(A); Staie v.
Hipkins (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 80, 83, 23 0.0.3d
123, 125, 430 N.E.2d 943, 945-946.

-

[84] [85] At the post-trial hearing, Mason also
wanted to inquire into jury deliberations especially on
the death penalty. Yet the trial court correctly ruled
that Mason had presented no evidence of outside
influences so as to avoid Evid.R. 606(B).
No
exception to the aliunde rule of evidence is

Page 30

appropriate simply for murder cases. Mason does not
have a constitutional right to know the nature of jury
*168
discussions during deliberations.
Thus,
Mason's contentions lack merit and are rejected.
[694 N.E.2d 956]

x
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
[86] Guilt Phase. Mason complains that his counsel
was ineffective in that he disclosed to the jury that
Mason was on parole when arrested on February 12,
and that his parole was thereafter revoked.
Yet the disclosure may well have been made for
tactical reasons. Mason's defense theory was that
police rushed to judgment and did not adequately
investigate Robin's murder because Mason was on
parole. Moreover, the state would inevitably have
proved Mason's felony convictions to impeach his
credibility as a witness. Evid.R. 609. Further, the
state could prove both convictions, since Mason was
charged with having a weapon under disability. R.C.
2923 .13(A)(2) and (3). Mason simply took the sting
out of the evidence by early disclosure. State v.
Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d at 34, 553 N.E.2d at 590.
As to other aspects of his counsel's guilt-phase
performance,
no
ineffectiveness
has
been
demonstrated, and Mason's complaints lack merit.
Trial counsel presented a strong, vigorous, thorough,
and aggressive defense before and during the trial.
Counsel also developed a "coherent and consistent
defense theory" that Mason was innocent and Chris
Dennis was guilty. See State v. Ballew (1996), 76
Ohio St.3d 244, 256, 667 N.E.2d 369, 381. Mason's
conviction demonstrates that the jury simply accepted
the state's interpretation of the evidence, and rejected
the theory presented by the defense.
Counsel's
performance did not fall "below an objective standard
of reasonable representation." State v. Bradley, 42
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of
the syllabus. We have reviewed each of a number of
instances Mason claims illustrate ineffective assistance
of counsel and find nothing reflecting "errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
Nor has Mason brought forth any conduct on the
part of his counsel demonstrating prejudice, "that
there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not
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for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have
been different." State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136,
538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.
[87] Penalty Phase. Mason argues that his counsel
failed to investigate and present a life history of
Mason and his psychological background so that he
would not receive the death penalty. Mason also
complains about the paucity of mitigation evidence
presented in defense.

*169 The record, however, suggests that defense
counsel had voluminous records about his history and
background.
Counsel prepared twelve exhibits
documenting aspects of Mason's childhood, such as
reports that he was beaten by his father and released
by his parents to juvenile authorities, as well as early
psychological evaluations, but did not present them to
the jury. Mason argues that these exhibits show that a
cogent, persuasive mitigation case could have been
built revealing Mason's childhood exposure to
violence, his dysfunctional family, and his early
emotional and psychological problems.

-

But the records also show prior involvements with
the criminal and juvenile justice systems, and other
unfavorable matters. Mason could not have presented
evidence as to his good character and rehabilitation
potential without risking the introduction of negative
evidence by the state in rebuttal.
[88] Similarly it was not an unreasonable strategic
decision to refrain from presenting the video
deposition of psychiatrist Dr. Spare in order to avoid
rebuttal by evidence of Mason's behavioral problel,Tls,
character deficiencies, and poor potential for
rehabilitation. We will not second-guess the strategic
decisions counsel made at trial even though appellate
counsel now argue that they would have defended
differently. State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380,
388, 513 N .E.2d 754, 762.
Nor has Mason shown prejudice, the second
Strickland requirement, namely "a reasonable
probability" that different tactical choices at the
penalty phase would have made a difference in the
result. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538
N .E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.
[694 N .E.2d 957]

XI

-
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Mason's attack on the constitutionality of Ohio's
death-penalty statute is surnrnarily rejected. State v.
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d
264; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520
N.E.2d 568, syllabus.

XII
Independent Sentence Evaluation
Sentencing Evidence.
Mason's mother, older
brother, who was a prison guard, and his older sister
all testified on Mason's behalf and pleaded with the
jury not to impose the death penalty. His mother said
he was a good son, and she loved him deeply. His
sister also loved him very much and thought Mason
was not a bad person.
A cousin testified that she believed the state's
correctional system had failed Mason and that he
deserved another chance to be rehabilitated. Two
deputy sheriffs testified that while Mason had been in
jail for over a year, he had not been a problem as an
inmate even on escorted trips.

*170 His wife, Terry Mason, pleaded with the jury
"not to kill" Mason. She testified that Mason was her
reason for living and without him she could not go on.
On cross-examination, Terry agreed that Mason was
not at home when she arrived there around 4: 15 p.m.
on February 8, 1993. Mason came home around 5:30
p.m., then left, and did not return until later that
night. Mason had done some drawings that his wife
and others thought showed great artistic promise.
In an unsworn statement, Mason begged for his life
on the basis that he had not killed Robin. He wanted
a life sentence so he would "have a chance to bring
this to Appeal Courts, * * * [which would] weigh the
evidence all over again, and see that I didn't have
nothing to do with that girl's death." Further, Mason
said, "I know, God knows, and everybody who knows
me knows, I don't have to answer to you guys no
more. I already answered to him."
[89] Sentence Evaluation.
After independent
assessment, we find that the evidence is sufficient to
prove the aggravating circumstance of felony-murder.
As to possible mitigating factors, nothing in the
nature and circumstances of the offense appears
mitigating.

Constitutionality
Mason's history and background provide a few
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mitigating features. His wife, mother, and other
family members love him and do not want him
executed. Also, he may have artistic talent.
At trial, Mason relied upon residual doubt. In the
syllabus to State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686
N. E. 2d 1112, however, this court held that residual
doubt can no longer be deemed a mitigating factor.
Mason's adjustment to jail is a mitigating factor, but
no other features of this case appear as mitigating
"other factors" under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).
The aggravating circumstance outweighs the
extremely modest Illltlgating factors presented.
Mason was convicted of raping Robin Dennis,
strangling her, and beating her to death. Even when
considered collectively, the mitigating factors are not
of great weight. Thus, the specified aggravating
circumstance outweighs the mitigation beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the death penalty is appropriate.
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turbulent childhood); State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d
at 104-106, 656 N.E.2d at 671-672 (nineteen year old,
no significant criminal record, hard worker, low
intelligence, deprived childhood); State v. Gumm, 73
Ohio St.3d at 432, 653 N.E.2d at 270 (deprived
childhood, retardation, no criminal history).
Imposing the death penalty in this case is neither
excessive nor disproportionate when compared with
similar felony-murder cases. See McGuire, Phillips,
*171. Gumm, supra; State v. Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d
86, 568 N .E.2d 674; State v. Henderson, 39 Ohio
St.3d 24, 528 N.E.2d 1237; State v. Apanovitch
(1987), [694 N.E.2d 958] 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 514
N.E.2d 394; State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31
OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383.
Accordingly, Mason's
sentence are affirmed.

convictions

and

death

Judgment affirmed.

-

[90] We find that that death sentence in the case at
bar is proportionate to penalties in other cases we
have reviewed. See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio
St.3d 390, 686 N .E.2d 1112 (mitigation evidence of
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